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I. INTRODUCTION 
3 
In January, 1975, the United States Supreme Court in 
Goss v. Lopez 1 extended the right of procedural due process to 
students who were subject to out-of-school suspensions of ten 
days or less. 2 The Court's 5-4 decision3 required public school 
authorities to provide "rudimentary"4 procedures to include 
"some kind of notice and ... some kind of hearing."5 
Although the Court required only minimal formality to 
protect a student's entitlement to a public education and to 
protect a liberty interest in one's reputation,6 Justice Powell, 
in dissent, lamented the unnecessary intervention by the 
Court. 7 Powell stated that the daily operation of public schools 
should be left to school officials8 and that "the 
constitutionalizing of routine classroom decisions ... [was] a 
significant and unwise extension of the Due Process Clause."9 
Wilkinson, a sympathetic commentator of the Powell 
* Associate Professor, Planning Policy and Leadership Studies, The University 
of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa. 
** Professor, Department of Social Work, University of Northern Iowa, Cedar 
Falls, Iowa. Currently a J.D. candidate in the College of Law, The University of 
Iowa. 
1. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
2. !d. at 5Hl. 
:1. The majority opinion was authored by Justice White and joined by Justices 
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall. A dissenting opinion was authored by 
Justice Powell and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and 
Rehnquist. 
4. Goss, 419 U.S. at 5Hl. 
5. !d. at 579. 
6. !d. at fi74. 
7. !d. at 5H5 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
X. !d. 
9. ld. at 595. 
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dissene0 and clerk for Justice Powell during the 1971 and 
1972 tenns, 11 expressed deep concern that the majority in 
Goss would eventually seek to expand the rudimentary due 
process afforded students and further fonnalize due process. 12 
Such expansion, he feared, would result in a diversion of scarce 
education resources 13 and the refocusing of educators' energies 
away from the educational process. 14 Wilkinson noted that 
public schools were becoming increasingly lawless. They needed 
more flexibility, and not due process, he argued, in order to 
control the flood of school violence. 15 Wilkinson's concern also 
extended to a fear of further formalizing and extending 
procedural safeguards not only to children facing suspension 
and expulsion from a public school but also to a broad range of 
discretionary decisions that teachers and school officials make 
almost on a daily basis. 16 
The primary purpose of this article is to determine what 
procedural due process is now available, nearly two decades 
since the Goss ruling, to public school students who may be 
subject to suspension or expulsion. 17 In exploring this topic, 
we also wish to assess the accuracy of concerns raised by 
persons, such as Powell and Wilkinson, that a requirement of 
procedural due process would greatly interfere with the 
operations of public education systems. This article is limited to 
court rulings involving constitutional procedural due process at 
the elementary and secondary levels and does not involve 
10. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School 
Superintendent, 197fi SUP. CT. REV. 2fi (197fi). 
11. J. WILKINSON, III, SERVING JUSTICE: A SUPREME COURT CLERK'S VIEW xiii 
(1974). 
12. Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 44. 
1.3. ld. at 60. 
14. ld. 
1fi. ld. at 66. Wilkinson stated: "But I do question the sensitivity of any 
decision to begin constitutionalizing the disciplinary process at its lowest rungs at 
precisely that time when the public is deeply anxious over a lack of discipline in 
the schools and when the maximum flexibility may be required by school officials 
in different parts of the country to reduce the level of violence in secondary 
education." 
16. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. fi6fi, fi97-59H (197/i) (Powell, J. dissenting); 
Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 80. 
17. 419 U.S. at liH4. The Goss majority indicated that "[!longer suspensions or 
expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more 
formal procedures." See Dolores J. Cooper & John L. Strope, Jr., Lonp-Term 
Suspensions and Expulsions After Goss, li7 EDUC. L. REP. 29 (Jan. 1H, 1990), for a 
straightforward review. See also Dolores Cooper & John L. Strope, Jr., Short-Term 
Suspensions Fourteen Years Later, fiH EDUC. L. REP. H71 (April 12, 1990), for a 
brief overview. 
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students in special education programs. 18 
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS19 
A. When Due Process Is Applicable 
5 
The Fourteenth Amendment specifies that no State shall 
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law."20 Thus, procedural due process is required 
only when government takes action that denies an individual 
life, liberty, or property. Absent a denial of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, under the Constitution, the government need not provide 
any process to the adversely affected individual. 21 
Since public schools do not engage in punishment which 
normally threatens life, the focus of most decisions involving 
schools is on the potential loss of property or liberty. Both have 
legal meaning beyond normal lay contexts. 
Property in the due process context includes a reasonable 
expection of receipt of a government benefit. Such expection 
must be objective, rather than subjective and is created, not in 
the Constitution, but by statutes, rules and practices.22 Thus, 
a teacher under a one year contract with a college that had no 
rules or policies creating a reasonable claim to reemployment 
18. This article does not analyze or critique court decisions pertaining to 
suspensions or expulsions at the college or university level. For a recent discussion, 
see James M. Picozzi, University Disciplinary Process: What's Fair, What's Due, and 
What You Don't Get, 96 YALE L.J. 21a2 (1987). 
The Court in Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. ~:!05, 808, 828-29 (1988), held that under 
the relevant provision of the Education of the Handicapped Act 20 U.S.C., § 
1415(e)(3) (1988), children with disabilities may not be excluded from the classroom 
because of "dangerous or disruptive conduct growing out of their disabilities." The 
Court concluded that there is no '"dangerous' exception in the "stay-put provision" 
of § 1415(e)(a) of the Act. Id. at 828. The Court, however, noted that schools 
could employ such procedures as the "use of study carrels, timeouts, detention, or 
the restriction of privileges." Id. at 3211. And, when necessary, the school may 
suspend a student for up to 10 school days while the school considers utilizing § 
1415(e)(2) to invoke the aid of the courts. !d. at 82fi-26. See also recent 
commentary: Eugene A. Lincoln, Disciplinin# Handicapped Students: Questions 
Unanswered in Honig v. Doe, fi1 EDllC. L. REP. 1 (March 16, 1989); Gail P. 
Sorenson, Special Education Discipline in the 1!-J.'IOs, 62 Enuc. L. REP. :-J87 (Nov. 8, 
1990); and, Larry Bartlett, Disciplining Handicapped Students: The Legal Issues In 
Light of Honig v. Doe, fi5 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN ::lfi7 (1989). 
19. For a critical summary of the development of procedural due process see 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 10-8 to 10-11 (2d ed. 
1988). 
20. 
21. 
22. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. fi64, fi78 (1972). 
!d. at 577. 
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had no property interest in reemployment.23 But, a college 
teacher who could demonstrate that college documents created 
an expection of continued employment after ten years of contin-
ued employment did have a property interest in reemploy-
ment.24 
Thus, it can be seen that property interests protected by 
procedural due process extend beyond the lay concept of proper-
ty in terms of real estate, possessions or money. 25 Property 
interests may take many forms, including the right to attend 
public school, if provided by state law.26 
Similary, the concept of liberty has meaning beyond the lay 
person's normal viewpoint. In addition to the obvious freedom 
from bodily restraint and physical punishment, liberty also 
involves a person's good name, reputation and standing in the 
community.27 This is especially true when the government's 
action will impose a stigma that forecloses a person's ability to 
take advantage of future employment opportunities.28 
Assuming that the state (e.g., a public school board) has 
taken action adverse to an individual, the first step in the legal 
analysis is to determine whether an individual has a protected 
liberty or property interest.29 When such interests are pres-
ent, it must be determined "what process is due"30 and wheth-
er the procedures used were constitutionally adequate.31 
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has settled on a bal-
ancing approach to determine the process that is due and the 
form in which it is to be applied.32 The factors to be consid-
ered are perhaps best formulated in the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Mathews v. Eldridge.33 The issue in Eldridge was 
whether an evidentiary hearing is required by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment prior to the discontinuance of 
23. ld. at 578. 
24. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972). 
25. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972). 
26. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975). 
27. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573. 
28. !d.; Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 705-06 (1976). 
29. Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).; 
Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 260 (1987). 
30. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
31. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 460 (1989) (citing 
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983)). The Court in Helms stated that "we 
must then decide whether the process afforded ... satisfied the minimum require-
ments of the Due Process Clause." 
32. TRIBE, supra note 19, at 715. 
33. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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Social Security disability benefit payments.34 The six-member 
majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Powell, concluded 
that such a hearing was not required. 35 
The Court specified three distinct factors that are critical 
to determining what process is due.36 The factors to be includ-
ed are 1) consideration of the importance of the individual's 
interest that will be taken away by government action,37 2) 
the risk of error in making the decision and possible benefits of 
requiring additional procedural safeguards, and 3) the 
government's interest in the activity involved and the difficulty 
created for the government by requiring additional due process 
procedures.38 In regard to the third criterion, the Court con-
cluded that although financial cost alone is not the controlling 
factor in determining whether due process requires a particular 
procedural safeguard, the public or government interest "in 
conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources is a factor 
that must be weighed."39 After balancing the three competing 
factors in Eldridge, the Court held that no evidentiary hearing 
is required prior to the termination of social security disability 
benefits. 40 
An important subsequent application of the Eldridge three-
factor test involved the constitutionality of disciplinary corporal 
punishment in the public schools.41 In a 5-4 opinion, also 
authored by Justice Powell, the Court held that the Due Pro-
cess Clause does not require public schools to provide notice 
and a hearing prior to the imposition of corporal punishment so 
long as corporal punishment is authorized and limited by the 
state's common or statutory law.42 The Court's balancing of 
the factors outlined in Eldridge was obvious in its reasoning; 
"[i]n view of the low incidence of abuse, the openness of our 
schools, and the common-law safeguards that already exist, the 
risk of error that may result in violation of a schoolchild's sub-
stantive rights can only be regarded as minimal."43 Justice 
Powell clearly stated that additional procedural safeguards 
34. !d. at 323. 
35. ld. at 349. 
36. ld. at 33fi. 
37. ld. 
3R. !d. 
39. ld. at 348. 
40. ld. at 349. 
41. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 6fil (1977). 
42. !d. at 682. 
43. ld. 
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were unwarranted in light of potential additional burdens on 
school officials.44 He noted that the Court has repeatedly em-
phasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of 
school officials to prescribe and control conduct in the 
schools.45 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, was reluc-
tant to impose additional procedural safeguards in corporal 
punishment situations out of a concern that such safeguards 
would "entail a significant intrusion into an area of primary 
educational responsibility."46 
B. What Process Is Due? 
Mter determining the presence of life, liberty or property 
interests that require procedural due process protection, it then 
must be determined which specific elements of due process 
must be provided. It is acknowledged that due process is flexi-
ble and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 
situation demands.47 As noted by the Court in a decision not 
involving education, "[t]he very nature of due process negates 
any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to 
every imaginable situation."48 This flexibility in due process 
requirements sometimes leads to disagreement about the spe-
cific elements required. There is general agreement, however, 
that due process requires, as a minimum, notice of alleged im-
proprieties and the opportunity to respond to the allegations in 
some type of hearing. 
As stated in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court consistently 
has held that some form of hearing is required before an indi-
vidual is finally deprived of a protected interest.49 But the 
right to be heard has little value unless the person is informed 
that the matter is pending and can choose how to respond. 50 
Thus, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential re-
quirements of procedural due process.51 Notice must convey 
44. !d. 
4fi. !d.; see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. fi65, fiH9-90 (197fi). 
46. ln![raham, 430 U.S. at 6H2. 
47. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, a41 U.S. 123, 162-63 (19fi1) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Friendly, infra note 55, at 127H-79; Hart v. 
Ferris State College, fi57 F. Supp. 1379, 1aH7 (W.D. Mich. 198a). 
48. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, a67 U.S. HH6, H9fi 
(1961). 
49. 424 U.S. at 333; see also, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 
5:~2. fi42 (198!'). 
50. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., aa9 U.S. ao6, 314 (19fi0). 
51. /d. at a!a-14; See also, Goldberg v. Kelley, a97 U.S. 2fi4, 267-6H (1970). 
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information regarding the allegations against the person52 and 
must be given in a timely manner53 so the person may pre-
pare a defense. 
The question becomes what elements of due process are 
required at the hearing. Judge Henry Friendly,54 a highly re-
spected jurist, has provided a detailed discussion of the ele-
ments of a fair hearing.55 He first noted that the hearing tri-
bunal must be unbiased or impartial.56 The Supreme Court 
has determined that there is a presumption that those who sit 
on tribunals are unbiased, and has noted that a presumption of 
impartiality can be rebutted only by a showing of conflict of 
interest or some other specific reason for disqualification. 57 
According to Judge Friendly, an essential element of a fair 
hearing is that a person must be provided an opportunity to 
prepare his or her case regarding the allegations contained in 
the notice.58 He also stated that due process generally pro-
vides the right to call witnesses on behalf of the person, to 
know about the evidence upon which the allegations in the 
notice are based, to have decisions made only upon evidence 
presented at the hearing,59 the right to legal counsel, the 
making of a record, a written statement and a finding of 
facts,60 public attendance, and the right to judicial review.61 
The last two are seldom discussed in court decisions involving 
schools. Judge Friendly noted, as will be discussed later, that 
the right of confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is 
highly debated, and the courts are greatly divided on the is-
sue.62 
The extent to which all of these elements of procedural due 
process are required, or not required, must be viewed in light of 
the unique aspects of the public school setting, the Eldridge 
three factor list, and most importantly, Goss v. Lopez.63 
52. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313. 
53. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267. 
54. Then a judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
55. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975). 
56. ld. at 1279. 
fi7. Schweiker v. McClure, 4fi6 U.S. 118, 19fi (1982); Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. 
No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976). 
58. Friendly, supra note 5fi, at 1280-81. 
59. ld. at 1282. 
60. Id. at 1287, 1291. 
61. ld. at 1293-94. 
62. ld. at 1288. 
68. E.g., Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 9fi (8rd Cir. 1989); Carey v. Maine 
Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 754 F. Supp. 906, 918 (D. Me. 1990). 
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Ill. Goss V. LOPEZ: MINIMAL DUE PROCESS IN 
THE SCHOOLS 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
[1993 
In 1971 a number of students were suspended from the 
Columbus Public School System in Ohio.64 Subsequently, nine 
student plaintiffs, accused of engaging in demonstrations, re-
fusing to obey a principal's directive, and attacking a police 
officer on the scene, challenged the constitutionality of the rele-
vant provisions of the Ohio statute and the disciplinary policies 
set forth in the Columbus Public School Administrative 
Guide.65 Of the nine plaintiffs, six were high school students 
whose disruptive behavior, observed by a school administrator, 
resulted in 10-day suspensions from school.66 Dwight Lopez, 
also a high school student,67 was suspended for a disturbance 
in a lunch room that he claimed he did not commit, and no 
contrary evidence was presented at trial by school administra-
tors.68 An eighth plaintiff, a junior high school student, was 
initially arrested but not formally charged for being present at 
a high school demonstration and then suspended by school 
officials for ten days.69 The Court noted that absent testimony 
by school authorities, there was no indication of what factors 
school authorities considered in deciding to suspend the stu-
dent. 70 The Court remarked that no testimony was offered re-
garding the suspension of a ninth student plaintiff. 71 
A three-judge district court panel held that the students 
were not accorded appropriate due process of law because they 
were suspended without a hearing prior to suspension or with-
64. Lopez v. Williams, 872 F. Supp. 1279, 12R1-H2 (S.D. Ohio 197a) (three-judge 
panel), affd, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). It is well acknowledged that Goss was triggered 
by numerous racial incidents between black and white students. However, the 
Court declined to comment on such tensions. See Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 80-
82. 
6fi. ld. at 1281. 
66. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. fi65, 569-70, n.4 (197fi). One of these students was 
given a second ten-day suspension for misconduct occurring on another occasion but 
which followed immediately on returning to school. See n. 4. Thus, the Court had 
the opportunity to address suspensions longer than ten days but declined to do so. 
67. ld. at 569-70. 
68. ld. at 570. 
69. ld. at fi70-71. It should be noted that the Supreme Court holding in CTOss 
v. Lopez also applies to students in junior high school and probably to students in 
elementary school. 
70. ld. 
71. ld. at 571. 
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in a reasonable time after suspension. 72 The decision was ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court by administrators 
of the Columbus Public School System. 73 
B. Students Have a Constitutionally Protected Interest in a 
Public Education 
The Supreme Court concluded that a ten day suspension 
from school is a legally significant loss and may be imposed 
only with provision of appropriate procedural due process.74 
The Court noted that protected property interests are not creat-
ed by the Constitution but are usually created by independent 
sources, such as state statutes, which entitle citizens to certain 
benefits. 75 Justice White, writing for the majority, indicated 
that while a right to a public education is not constitutionally 
mandated,76 there are legitimate claims of entitlement to a 
public education that are recognized as a property interest 
when state law provides both for a public education and re-
quires school attendance. 77 Such interests are protected by the 
Due Process Clause and may not be taken away without the 
provision of minimal due process elements.78 
The majority also concluded that short-term suspensions 
infringed on a student's liberty interests which are protected by 
the Due Process Clause. 79 The majority noted that even short-
term suspensions could damage the students' reputation and 
standing with their fellow pupils and teachers, and school re-
cords of the incident could interfere with later opportunities for 
higher education and employment.~"~0 This view of reputation 
being a liberty interest was revised in a subsequent Supreme 
Court ruling, and now state action must stigmatize a person's 
reputation in the community in order for a liberty interest to 
be involved.81 
The Court rejected an argument that the Due Process 
Clause applies only when a student is subjected to a grievous 
72. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1973). 
73. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. !'i6!'i, !'i67 (197fi). 
74. !d. at fi76. 
7Fi. !d. at fi72-78. 
76. !d. at fi72. 
77. !d. at Fin. 
7R. !d. at fi74. 
79. !d. 
RO. !d. at fi7fi. 
Hl. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 698, 712 (1976); Boster v. Philpot, 64Fi F. Supp. 
798, ROfi (D. Kan. 19R6). 
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loss or severe detriment.82 It recognized that constitutional 
due process protections were triggered when the property loss 
was more than de minimis. The Court, citing Board of Regents 
v. Roth,83 commented that courts must look to the nature of 
the interest at stake, and concluded that a ten day suspension 
is not de minimis.84 It concluded that because an education is 
of such great import in the modern world, even suspension 
from school for as little as ten days is not so minor a penalty 
that due process protections could be ignored.85 
C. The Process That Is Due for Short Term Suspensions 
The majority in Goss concluded that for brief suspensions 
of ten days or less, a trial-type hearing is not required, but due 
process does require that the student be given either oral or 
written notice of the charges; if the charges are denied, a de-
scription of the evidence and an opportunity to present his or 
her side of the situation must be given.86 When these rudi-
mentary hearings occur, the student must be told what miscon-
duct has been charged, the reasons for the accusation, and the 
student must be allowed to explain his or her version of the 
events surrounding the incident.87 The Court stated that such 
procedures may occur immediately following notice or they may 
occur at a later time. 88 The Court added that the hearing be-
tween the student and school officials can be an informal give-
and-take, so long as it allows the student to explain his or her 
views. 89 The primary purpose of the rudimentary hearing pro-
cess is to assure that mistaken findings of student misconduct 
do not result in an arbitrary exclusion from school.90 The 
Court noted that it was not requiring anything more than what 
a "fair-minded" principal would undertake in order to avoid 
errors in making decisions.91 
82. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. fi6fi, fi7fi (197fi). 
83. 408 U.S. fi64 (1972). 
84. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 56fi, 57fi-76 (197fi). 
8fi. !d. 
86. !d. at fi8l. 
87. !d. at 582. 
88. !d. 
89. Id. at .584. In Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 4.'3/'i U.S. 78, 8/'i-86 (1978), the 
Court, in dicta, essentially reiterated its position. "All that Goss required was an 
'informal give-and-take' between the student and the administrative body dis-
missing him that would, at least, give the student 'the opportunity to characterize 
his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper context.'" 
90. !d. 
91. !d. at 583. 
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Notice and a rudimentary hearing should normally be 
provided to the student prior to the student's removal from 
school, but the Court identified certain situations that do not 
require notice and hearing prior to removal. 92 The Court stat-
ed that immediate removal is appropriate when students pose a 
continuing danger to themselves or to others or present a con-
tinuing threat of disruption to the educational environment.93 
In these situations, the student may be suspended prior to re-
ceipt of due process, but must be provided with notice and at 
least a rudimentary hearing as soon as reasonably possible. 94 
D. The Process that Is Not Required for Suspensions of Ten 
Days or Less 
Short-term suspensions do not require that the student be 
afforded an opportunity to be represented by legal counsel, to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses, or to call witnesses to 
support his or her side of the situation.95 The Court's ratio-
nale for limiting the availability of additional procedures in-
cluded concern that such requirements would over burden 
school administrators and result in expensive court-like pro-
ceedings. 96 The Court also feared that further formalizing of 
the process of short-term suspension hearings would result in a 
limiting of the educational effectiveness of suspensions.97 
Though additional procedural safeguards are not required 
in Goss, the Court noted that a school administrator could 
decide, when warranted, to allow cross-examination, the pre-
sentation of student's own witnesses and access to legal coun-
sel.98 In appropriate situations, such as when known personal-
ity conflicts exist between an accusing teacher and a student, a 
reasonable school administrator may seek to reach a fair result 
by allowing additional procedural rights. 
IV. DUE PROCESS SINCE Goss V. LOPEZ 
A. When is an Educational Deprivation Protected? 
In Goss, the Supreme Court did not state that all student 
92. ld. at fiH2. 
9::1. I d. 
94. ld. at fiH2-H::!. 
9fi. ld. at fiH::!. 
96. I d. 
97. I d. 
9H. ld. at fiH4. 
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infractions require procedural due process - only those that 
involve a significant student interest. In reviewing due process 
issues, courts must initially determine if the deprivation suf-
fered by a student results in "the total exclusion from the edu-
cational process for more than a trivial period."99 If a depriva-
tion is legally insignificant, then a property interest is not 
implicated and there is no requirement of constitutional due 
process. The Court in Goss v. Lopez clearly indicated that a ten 
day suspension from school is significant 100 but left open the 
possibility that a shorter suspension may be de minimis. 101 
Justice Powell, writing a dissenting opinion, commented crit-
ically that a one-day suspension now involves "a new constitu-
tional right."102 Judge Friendly also commented that "a hear-
ing may be required for a suspension of two days - or perhaps 
even two hours - at least when the sanction is noted on the 
student's record."103 
Because the Court in Goss expressly addressed only out-of-
school, short-term suspensions not exceeding ten days, it has 
been left to lower courts to extend the spirit of the law as out-
lined in Goss. To further understand when a property or liberty 
interest is implicated, a review of subsequent lower court rul-
ings will focus on in-school and out-of-school suspensions and 
other sanctions that may be imposed on students, such as loss 
of academic credit and restrictions in participation in extra-cur-
ricular activities. 
1. Out-of-school suspensions 
A three-day suspension has been held legally significant 
because class-time missed can not be made up and, suspensions 
are noted on a student's school records which are often avail-
able to prospective employers and college admissions person-
nel.104 Other courts in situations involving vandalism, insub-
ordination, and fighting have also implicitly acknowledged that 
a three-day suspension implicated a property interest and 
99. !d. at 576. 
100. !d. 
101. !d. The Court perhaps intimated that some suspension for less than 10 
days may be for only a "trivial period." The majority did, however, note that due 
process attaches for suspensions of "10 days or less." !d. at 581. 
102. !d. at 585 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
103. Friendly, supra note 55, at 1275, n. 50. 
104. Hillman v. Elliott, 436 F. Supp. 812, 81.5 (W.D. Va. 1977). The court did 
not specifically address whether a liberty or property interest was implicated but 
one may surmise that the court was referring to a property interest. 
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therefore was not de minimis. 105 The Sixth Circuit has ruled 
that a seven-day suspension was controlled by the Goss rul-
ing. 106 The court decisions referenced here did not expressly 
address the issue of liberty interest but generally referred only 
to the loss of a property interest. 
2. In-school suspensions 
In-school isolation in a detention room has been found to 
be a deprivation of education like the effect of an out-of-school 
suspension. 107 In Mississippi, a high school student who 
would not submit to corporal punishment was initially sus-
pended from school for three days and then for an indefinite 
period until she would accept paddling. 108 Subsequently the 
school board allowed the student to return without submitting 
to paddling but decided that she would be placed in a school 
detention room. 109 The court indicated that not all in-school 
detentions would be equivalent to out-of-school suspensions, 
but determinations would depend on the extent of the depriva-
tion of normal educational opportunities. 110 If exclusion from 
the educational process was total within the school, it would be 
equivalent to an out-of-school suspension. 111 If in-school isola-
tion was found to be equivalent to out-of-school suspension, 
then the days absent from the normal classroom would be com-
bined. If the total time of suspension exceeded ten days, more 
formal procedures than those found in Goss would be re-
quired.112 
In an Arkansas case, a special education student's substan-
lOfi. Students who had admitted vandalism of a grade school were suspended for 
three days in Boster v. Philpot 64fi F. Supp. 79R, R04 (D. Kan. 1986). A student 
was given a three-day suspension for insubordination in Wayne County Bd. of 
Educ. v. Tyre, 404 S.E.2d 809 (Ga. App. 1991). A student was given a three-day 
suspension for striking another student, but the suspension was not required to be 
served in a subsequent school year when the school did not impose the sanction 
during the school year in which the incident occurred in Rossman v. Conran, fi72 
N.E.2d 728 (Ohio App. 1988). 
106. Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 11fi9 (6th Cir. 19R7). 
107. Cole v. Newton Special Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 676 F. Supp. 749, 752 
(S.D. Miss. 1987), a{fd, Rfi3 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1988). The court did not indicate 
whether a liberty or property interest was implicated. The court assumed that a 
student had an interest in attending school but primarily addressed the question of 
what procedural safeguards were due. 
lOR. ld. at 751. 
109. ld. 
110. ld. 
111. ld. at 7fi2. 
112. ld. 
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tive due process rights were found not to have been violated 
when he received a three-day in-school suspension due to tardi-
ness and was isolated in a special classroom. 113 The class-
room had adequate floor space, lighting, and windows, and the 
special education placement committee had determined that 
the suspension would not adversely affect the student. The 
student completed all his assigned work and did not fall behind 
in his school work as a result of being placed in the special 
classroom. 114 Because the student was not actually excluded 
from the educational process, the court found that no property 
interest in a public education was implicated. 115 The court 
added that procedural due process was not implicated because 
on the facts, this three-day in-school suspension was de mini-
mis.116 
Similarly, a student who was given a three-day in-school 
suspension and an eleven-day restriction, including exclusion 
from the senior class outing and extra-curricular activities, did 
not receive a punishment sufficient to constitute deprivation of 
a property or liberty interest. 117 The punishment assigned 
was considered de minimis because the student was expected to 
do assigned school work while serving the in-school suspen-
sion. 118 The senior class outing alone was not found to be a 
constitutionally protected civil right. 119 The student's alleged 
liberty interest in his reputation was summarily dismissed. The 
court concluded that the student's reputation was not seriously 
damaged by his being kept in school with the restrictions im-
posed.120 
In another decision involving an in-school suspension, a 
sixth-grade student was placed in "time out" within his class-
room.121 The student was permitted to remain in the class-
room and perform class work and was allowed to attend all 
other classes in other parts of the school. He was allowed to 
leave "time out" for appropriate reasons, such as use of a 
restroom, and he was not physically restrained or subjected to 
113. Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 565 (8th Cir. 1988). 
114. !d. at 566. 
115. !d. at 563. 
116. !d. 
117. Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767, 772 (W.D. Pa. 1976). 
118. !d. 
119. !d. 
120. !d. at 773. 
121. Dickens v. Johnson County Bd. of Educ., 661 F. Supp. 155, 156 (E.D. Tenn. 
1987). 
1] WHAT PROCESS IS DUE 17 
pain. 122 The court concluded that interference with the boy's 
educational opportunity was trivial, and neither a property nor 
liberty interest was implicated. 123 A similar result was found 
when a student alleged violation of his due process rights when 
he was placed on probation without any actual school time 
missed. 124 
3. Loss of academic credit 
A state supreme court has concluded, in accordance with 
its interpretation of Goss v. Lopez, that loss of academic credit 
for the entire semester was a property interest qualifying for 
protection under the Due Process Clause. 125 The decision in-
volved a sixteen-year-old sophomore who had drunk two or 
three sips of beer in her home before going to school on the last 
day of the school term. 126 
4. Participation in academic programs 
A student who had been discharged from an elite high 
school for failure to meet academic requirements and involun-
tarily transferred to a less selective school, argued that she had 
been denied procedural due process. 127 The court first distin-
guished the standards applicable to academic discharge from 
those related to misconduct and then noted that courts give 
considerable deference to education professionals in matters of 
academic standards. 128 It then determined that due process 
was satisfied in this instance, but noted that academic disci-
pline does not implicate the same legal requirements as disci-
pline for misconduct. 129 The court did not indicate what pro-
cedures would be required if, as in this case, the student could 
not attend any local high school.130 One court has upheld stu-
dent arguments that Goss should be applied to involuntary 
transfers between attendance centers for disciplinary rea-
sons.131 In a completely different situation, another court has 
122. ld. 
123. ld. at 158. 
124. Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995, 1002-03 (D. Me. 1982). 
125. Warren County Bd. of Educ. v. Wilkinson, 500 So.2d 455, 458 (Miss. 1986). 
126. ld. at 456. 
127. Spencer v. New York City Bd. of Higher Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 358, 359 (Sup. 
Ct. 1986). 
128. ld. at 359. 
129. ld. 
130. ld. 
131. Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
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held that expulsion from a private school for misconduct does 
not require the protections of procedural due process unless 
substantial state action can be demonstrated. 132 
A student's decision to graduate earlier than originally 
planned because of what she claimed became an oppressive 
school environment after her removal as head cheerleader was 
found by one court not to constitute deprivation of either a 
property or liberty interest. 133 No property interest was im-
plicated because students are afforded only the opportunity to 
graduate, not to graduate on a specified date. 134 In the ab-
sence of proven damage to her reputation or the school's publi-
cizing her dismissal as a cheerleader, no liberty interest was 
involved. 135 
In the absence of a statute or rule creating a reasonable 
expectation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit determined that a high school student who was not 
allowed to enroll in certain courses did not have a property 
interest in a specific course of study. 136 The United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York has ruled 
that the shortening of the school day by forty-five minutes per 
day for two days a week in an effort to economize was not a 
deprivation implicating due process rights. 137 The court com-
mented that the state did not significantly limit a right to an 
education any more than when decisions are made regarding 
curriculum requirements, the assignment of study halls, or 
requiring attendance at a school assembly. 138 
The United States District Court for the Western District 
of North Carolina found that a student who was denied the 
opportunity to participate in a graduation ceremony because he 
was in violation of the dress code for the ceremony did not have 
a property right in participation nor was he deprived of a liber-
ty right. 139 In a subsequent ruling on the issue of a property 
right in participation in graduation ceremonies in California, 
another court ruled that even the completing of all graduation 
1:32. Wisch v. Sanford Sch., Inc., 420 F. Supp. U!lO, 181:3 (D. Del. 1976) (citing 
Reitman v. Mulkey, :3R7 U.S. 869 (1967)). 
1:{:3. Haverkamp v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 880, 689 F. Supp. 1055, 1059 (D. Kan. 
1986). 
184. ld. 
1:35. ld. 
1:36. Arundar v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 620 F.2d 49:3, 494 (5th Cir. 19RO). 
1:11. Znll v. Anker, 414 F. Supp. 1024, 102R (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
1:38. Id. 
1:39. Fowler v. Williamson, 448 F. Supp. 497, 501-02 (W.D.N.C. 1978). 
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requirements did not give rise to a protected property interest 
in participating in graduation ceremonies. 140 The second court 
also rejected a liberty interest argument, noting that the stu-
dent was not prevented from attending graduation ceremonies 
and that school officials did not publicize his situation. 141 In 
another ruling, a court held that the use of placement tests to 
assign students at different achievement levels in a non-graded 
elementary school did not implicate a protected property inter-
est. 142 
5. Activities that facilitate school attendance 
Parents and students have even challenged the implemen-
tation of a school policy that temporarily suspended certain 
school bus routes when students violated rules pertaining to 
proper conduct on the bus. 143 The First Circuit held that tem-
porary suspensions of bus routes were de minimis because the 
loss resulted only in inconvenience and not in a loss of educa-
tional opportunity. 144 
6. Extracurricular activities 
School attendance is usually required by state statute for 
school age children; also mandated is a course of required in-
struction sufficient to obtain a high school diploma. However, 
numerous other school activities not directly related to instruc-
tion are arguably essential to a well-rounded educational expe-
rience. Students are therefore encouraged to participate in 
activities such as student government, athletics, school bands 
and orchestras, and student newspapers and yearbooks. Depri-
vation of these extra-curricular activities has been periodically 
challenged by students as a violation of their property or liber-
ty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Goss decision involved the issue of "total exclusion 
from the educational process" in the context of a ten day out-of-
140. Swany v. San Ramon Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 720 F. Supp. 764, 77:-l-74 
(N.D. Cal. 19R9). 
141. !d. at 77fi-76. 
142. Smith v. Dallas County Bd. of Educ., 4RO F. Supp. 1324, 13:-lR (S.D. Ala. 
1979). 
143. Rose v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 679 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 19R2). The suspension 
"policy was applied to instances of serious disruption, significant vandalism, or 
danger." ld. at 2RO. Under the policy, school officials would first try to identify the 
guilty students but, when the students could not be identified, the school route 
would be suspended for a period not exceeding five days. 
144. !d. at 2R2. 
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school suspension. 145 A year later, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had occasion to interpret the 
meaning of the phrase "educational process" in the context of a 
transfer rule that barred transferring students from athletic 
competition for one year. 146 
The educational process is a broad and comprehensive concept 
with a variable and indefinite meaning. It is not limited to 
classroom attendance but includes innumerable separate 
components, such as participation in athletic activity and 
membership in school clubs and social groups, which combine 
to provide an atmosphere of intellectual and moral advance-
ment. We do not read Goss to establish a property interest 
subject to constitutional protection in each of these separate 
components. 147 
The Tenth Circuit held that interscholastic athletic participa-
tion is not a constitutionally protected right. 148 
A previous decision involving a similar imposition of ath-
letic ineligibility for transfer students supported the Tenth 
Circuit's opinion in Albach. 149 The court concluded that the 
property interest in an education involved the many combined 
activities of school attendance and could not be subdivided into 
separate property rights, each protected by the Constitution. 
According to the court, to find otherwise would result in a due 
process hearing being requirement for each removal from an 
athletic team, club, or activity. 150 
A 1992 ruling in Arkansas agreed and held that recogniz-
ing a property right in athletics, band, theater and choir would 
result in a deluge of litigation by students. 151 The court stat-
ed that participation in athletics was not a constitutionally 
protected claim of entitlement, but merely an expectation. 152 
On a more philosophical note, the court stated that students 
145. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975). 
146. Albach v. Odie, 531 F.2d 983 (lOth Cir. 1976). 
147. !d. at 985. 
148. !d. at 984-85; see also Boster v. Philpot, 645 F. Supp. 798, R05-06 CD. Kan., 
1986) (finding no right to attend athletic contests). 
149. Dallam v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 391 F. Supp. 35R (M.D. Pa. 1975). 
150. !d. at 361; see also Berschback v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Dist., 397 
N.W.2d 234, 242 (Mich. App. 1986) (citing Albach with approval); Tiffany v. Arizo-
na Interscholastic Ass'n, Inc, 726 P.2d 231, 234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 19R6) (quoting 
Albach with approval); Hamilton v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 552 
F.2d 9Rl (6th Cir. 1976); Herbert v. Ventetudo, 63R F.2d 5 (1st Cir. l9RO). 
151. McFarlin v. Newport Special Sch. Dist., 7R4 F. Supp 5R9 (E.D. Ark. 1992). 
152. !d. at 592. 
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should recognize that it is a fact of life that on occasion all 
people are subjected to arbitrary and unjust decision mak-
ing.I53 
In 1986, the Kansas federal district court analyzed anum-
ber of cases regarding the question of a property right in extra-
curricular activities involving a student removed as a cheer-
leader, and concluded that there is no federally protected prop-
erty right in interscholastic athletics under the majority 
rule. 154 The court, however, acknowledged three groups of 
cases that held that students have constitutionally protected 
interests in extracurricular activities. 155 These courts rea-
soned that participation in varsity athletics constituted a prop-
erty interest because of students' potential future educational 
or professional sports opportunities, because participation in 
such activities is an integral part of the total education process, 
or because the denial of the right to participate may violate the 
Equal Protection Clause. 156 The Kansas court followed the 
majority view and held that no property interest existed in 
being a head cheerleader or a member of the cheerleading 
squad. 157 The court reasoned that future educational oppor-
tunities are mere expectations and are insufficient to create a 
constitutionally protected property interest. 158 
Court decisions since 1986 have generally followed the 
majority rule that students do not have a property or liberty 
interest in a variety of extracurricular activities. 159 In one, a 
high school senior and defending state champion wrestler was 
declared ineligible to continue on the wrestling team for mis-
conduct he and three other males committed with a young 
1fi::!. !d. at fi93. 
1fi4. Haverkamp v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 380, 689 F. Supp. 10fifi, 10fi7 (D. Kan. 
19R6); see Bernstein v. Menard, fifi7 F. Supp. 90, 91 (1982) (finding no constitution-
al right to play a trumpet in a high school band). 
lfifi. !d. 
lfi6. !d.; see e.p., Boyd v. Bd. of Educ. of McGehee Sch. Dist., 612 F. Supp. 86 
(D. Ark. 19/'lfi); Kelley v. Metro Bd. of Educ. of Nashville, 293 F. Supp. 48fi (M.D. 
Tenn. 1968); Gilprin v. Kansas State High Sch. Activities Ass'n Inc., 877 F. Supp. 
1283 (D. Kan. 1974). 
1fi7. !d. at 10fiR. 
1fi8. !d. 
lfi9. See, e.g., Simkins v. South Dakota Sch. Activities Ass'n, 484 N.W.2d 367, 
368 (S.D. 1989) (fmding that a student who transferred from one school to a Bible 
academy while his parents remained in the former school district which rendered 
student ineligible to participate in interscholastic athletics for one year did not 
have a life, liberty, or property interest as he had "not suffered a 'total exclusion' 
from the educational process"); Mississippi High Sch. Activities Ass'n v. Ferris, fi01 
So.2d 393, 397 (Miss. 1989). 
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woman in the student's home. 160 The student was held not to 
have a liberty or property interest notwithstanding his out-
standing four-year high school wrestling record or the likeli-
hood that if he continued to excel in wrestling tournaments, he 
would receive a college scholarship. 161 
The Sixth Circuit has held that participation in an election 
for student council president was not protected by the Due 
Process Clause, notwithstanding the possibility that the winner 
would receive a modest scholarship. 162 In another decision in-
volving elective student office, a different court ruled that a 
student does not have a constitutionally protected interest in 
running for high school student office. 163 
In Pegram v. Nelson, a junior high school student received 
a ten day suspension and additional school restrictions under a 
probation that prevented him from remaining on school 
grounds after 3:15 p.m. or participating in or attending school 
activities for the remainder of the school year which was ap-
proximately four months. 164 Although acknowledging that 
there was no property interest in participating in extracurricu-
lar activities, 165 the court suggested that depending upon the 
circumstances, "total exclusion from participating in ... extra-
curricular activities for a lengthy period of time could ... be a 
sufficient deprivation to implicate due process."166 The court 
declined to determine whether the student qualified for proce-
dural due process but assumed that even if the student did 
qualify, he had previously received all the process that was due 
at the time he was suspended from school. 167 Applying the 
Eldridge testi 68 the court concluded that the process required 
under Goss was sufficient. 169 However, the court did leave 
open the possibility that total exclusion from extracurricular 
160. Brands v. Sheldon Community Sch., 671 F. Supp. 627, 629 (N.D. Iowa 
1987). 
161. !d. at 631; see also Thompson v. Fayette County Pub. Sch., 786 S.W.2d R79, 
882 (Ky.App. 1990) (finding no property right to continue on wrestling team when 
grade point average went below 2.0). 
162. Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 
723 (1990). 
16.'3. Bull v. Dardanelle Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 745 F. Supp. 145/i, 1461 (E.D. 
Ark. 1990). 
164. 469 F. Supp. 1134, 1137 (M.D.N.C. 1979). 
16/i. !d. at 1139. 
166. !d. at 1140. 
167. !d. at 1141. 
168. See supra text accompanying notes 33-46. 
169. Pegram, 469 F. Supp. at 1140-41. 
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activities for a semester or longer might qualify as a property 
interest. 170 
B. When Can a Student be Removed from School 
Prior to Notice and Hearing? 
In Goss, the Supreme Court stated that as a general rule 
notice and hearing should precede a student's removal from 
school. 171 It acknowledged, however, that situations arise that 
do not require hearings to be held prior to suspensions. 172 
The Court indicated that students may be removed immediate-
ly from school when their "presence poses a continuing danger 
to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the 
academic process."173 The Court indicated that in such situa-
tions notice and hearing should be provided in a reasonable 
time thereafter. 174 
In one subsequent lower court decision, high school stu-
dents who were suspended from all classes one day prior to 
rescheduled suspension hearings argued that they had been de-
nied due process. 175 The court, citing the Goss analysis for ex-
ceptions to prior notice and hearing, first indicated that the 
students' use of drugs just outside the school would have justi-
fied immediate removal from the school by school officials. 176 
The court then noted that the hearing delay actually resulted 
from mutual agreement of the students' attorney and the 
school's attorney. 177 The court concluded that the hearing 
conducted one day after removal of the students from school, 
was held as soon as feasible by the school officials and was suf-
ficiently prompt to meet the Goss requirements. 178 
In another decision, a group of vocal and disruptive stu-
dents led a walkout of students from a high school. The inci-
170. !d. at 1140. 
171. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582 (1975); see Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. 
Supp. 397, 403 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (ruling that a student must remain in school pend-
ing a hearing, unless an emergency exists). 
172. !d. 
ln. !d. 
174. !d. 
175. White v. Salisbury Township Sch. Dist., 588 F. Supp. 608, 613 (E.D. Pa. 
19R4). 
176. !d. at 613. The district judge, relying on the Goss analysis for exceptions to 
prior notice and hearing, indicated that the misconduct of student-plaintiffs "cer-
tainly raises the possibility of danger to persons or property as well as the threat 
of disruption of the academic process." 
177. !d. at 614. 
17R. !d. 
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dent was partially related to interracial trouble at the 
school. 179 The principal later announced over the local radio 
station that all student participants in the walkout were sus-
pended for ten days. 180 Obviously, no rudimentary hearings 
were held prior to the suspensions. However, within three 
school days, conferences were held with all the students and 
their parents, and all suspensions were ended. 181 The Fifth 
Circuit ruled that because of the ongoing threat of disruption to 
the education process, there had been no reasonable opportuni-
ty for hearings on the day of the suspension. It found that post-
suspension hearings held with each student and his or her 
parents did not violate the procedural due process rights of the 
students.18:l 
C. When is a Tribunal Not Impartial? 
The Goss opinion did not specifically address the issue of 
impartiality of hearing officers. Rather, the Court appears to 
presume, with respect to short-term suspensions, that school 
disciplinarians will proceed in good faith. 183 It is also clear 
that school officials may perform multiple functions and still be 
presumed to be fair: observer of misconduct, provider of notice, 
hearing officer, and dispenser of short-term suspension. 184 
However, if an administrator makes a disciplinary recommen-
dation, such as an involuntary disciplinary transfer from one 
school to another, neither that administrator nor anyone subor-
dinate should be the decision maker. 185 It would permissible 
for a person in a superior administrative position to make a 
final ruling. 186 
In a case arising in Virginia, a student's parents alleged 
179. Sweet v. Childs, fi07 F.2d 67fi, 678 (fith Cir. 197fi), rehf;; denied fi18 F.2d 
820, :321 (5th Cir. 1971i). 
180. !d. 
181. !d. 
182. !d. at 681. 
188. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 561i, 580 (197fi). The Court stated that a pre-
sumption exists that "hearing officers . . . are unbiased [citations omitted]. This 
showing can he rebutted by a showing of conflict of interest or some other specific 
reason for disqualification." See also Schweiker v. McClure, 41i6 U.S. 188, 191i 
(1982); Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976) 
(holding that school board not biased in termination of striking teachers); Salazar 
v. Laty, 761 F. Supp. 41i, 47 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (citing Goss as requiring an unbiased 
decision maker). 
1R4. !d. at n82. 
185. Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. Supp. :397, 402 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
186. !d. 
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that the student's due process rights had been violated when a 
principal suspended the student for a second time. 187 The stu-
dent had been reinstated by the school after the first suspen-
sion because officials were uncertain whether due process had 
been satisfied. The parents argued that because the principal 
was involved in the first suspension proceeding and because he 
was an employee of the school, he was not an impartial deci-
sion maker at the subsequent hearing. 188 The court rejected 
the arguments, noting that there was no evidence of actual 
bias, that finders of fact are not considered biased merely be-
cause they are familiar with the facts, and that due process 
does not prohibit the finder of fact from being an employee of 
the school. tR!J 
A Delaware state court has held that a hearing officer who 
was an employee of the same school district as the student 
must be fair and impartial, but that due process does not re-
quire a fair and impartial hearing officer be chosen from among 
non-employees of the district. 190 Similarly, the California Su-
preme Court has held that a state statute providing for school 
district employees who are not employed at the student's school 
of attendance to serve on hearing panels considering expulsion, 
does not violate a student's due process rights. 191 
An interesting illustration of this situation arose in Texas, 
when an assistant principal involved in the initiation and in-
vestigation of drug use and sale found evidence through a 
search of the student. 192 The student was suspended from 
school for three days, and a review hearing was scheduled to 
consider the possibility of a long-term suspension. 193 The as-
sistant principal also served as a judge on a campus-review 
board that recommended suspension for the remaining school 
year/94 although the suspension actually lasted only about 
eight weeks. 195 The student argued in court that the assistant 
1R7. Hillman v. Elliott, 436 F. Supp. R12, R14 (W.D. Va. 1977). 
1RR. !d. at R14, R16. 
1H9. !d.; seP also Long v. Thornton Township High Sch. Dist. 20fi, 823 F.R.D. 
1R6, 192 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (holding that dual roles does not automatically disqualify 
a decision maker); Gonzales v. McEuen, 43fi F. Supp. 460, 464 (C.D. Cal. 1977) 
(holding that some familiarity with the facts does not disqualify a decision maker). 
190. Rucker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., fi 17 A.2d 708, 70fi (Del. Super. Ct. 1986). 
191. John A. v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist., 6fi4 P.2d 242, 247 (Cal. 
19H3). 
192. 
193. 
194. 
19fi. 
Brewer v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 261 (fith Cir. 19Hfi). 
!d. 
!d. 
!d. at 262. 
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principal could not be an impartial member of the review board 
because he had previously been an investigator and then a 
witness before the board. 196 The Fifth Circuit concluded that 
absent actual demonstrated bias the student did not receive an 
impartial hearing, a school official may serve as both an inves-
tigator and a hearing officer. 197 
Courts have also found that when a school board goes into 
closed-session deliberations and includes school officials who 
participated in the deliberations, even though they previously 
engaged in such roles as prosecutor and adverse witnesses in 
the hearing, the school board may exclude the student and his 
counsel. 198 The Seventh Circuit reasoned, relying on Goss, 
that due process requirements are met when the student is 
provided an opportunity to present his or her story to the 
board. 199 
Consistent with the holding discussed above, the Sixth 
Circuit has held that school boards may allow school officials, 
including the superintendent, involved in prior disciplinary 
actions to attend and participate in closed sessions, but deny 
access to a student and his attorney.200 The court added, in a 
footnote, that school officials could not have been decision mak-
ers in a pre-expulsion hearing if they "possessed either a pre-
existing animus towards him or had developed a bias because 
of their involvement in the incident ... "201 
The court decisions are inconsistent on the issue of the role 
of the school board attorney and whether his or her activity re-
sults in a biased school board decision maker. It has been held 
that a school board attorney may engage in multiple roles at an 
expulsion hearing - including prosecution, ruling on motions 
and objections made by the student's counsel, and advising the 
school board - where a student receives a thirty day suspen-
sion, is represented by an attorney, and is afforded an opportu-
nity to present his version of the alleged misconduct. 202 
However, one year later another federal district court 
reached a contrary result. That court concluded that when 
school district attorneys performed the dual role of prosecutor 
196. ld. at 264. 
197. ld. 
198. Lamb v. Panhandle Community Unif. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 826 F.2d fi26, fi29 
(7th Cir. 1987). 
199. ld. (citing Betts v. Board of Educ., 466 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1972). 
200. Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 927 (6th cir. 1988). 
201. ld. 
202. Alex v. Allen, 409 F. Supp . .379, .387-88 (W.D. Pa. 1976). 
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and advisor to the school board in an expulsion hearing before 
the board, a presumption of bias existed.203 Interestingly, in 
the same decision the court ruled that the superintendent's 
mere presence at board deliberations violated the students' due 
process rights to an impartial hearing tribunal because the 
superintendent served as both the chief advisor to the board 
and chief of the administrative team prosecuting the stu-
dents.204 This ruling is in sharp contrast to the Sixth Circuit's 
ruling that allowed superintendent participation in board delib-
erations as discussed above. 205 
D. What Type of Notice is Required? 
Whenever proposed discipline by school officials involves a 
protected property or liberty interest, students "must be given 
some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing."206 Ef-
fective notice requires that a student be told what the student 
stands accused of doing and what evidence exists to substanti-
ate the accusation.207 This is required so that the student has 
a fair opportunity to explain his or her side of the situa-
tion.208 That is why notice is essential to due process.209 
1. Short-term suspensions 
Several court decisions rendered subsequent to Goss pro-
vide some direction in answering what type of notice is re-
quired in short-term suspensions. In one, a junior high school 
student had been involved in four fights at school over a period 
of two months. The student argued that he had received notice 
from an assistant principal that he would be suspended only 
for a single fight, but on the facts, a three-day suspension was 
rendered by the principal who considered evidence of each fight 
and based the decision to suspend on the cumulative of effect 
all four incidents.210 On appeal, the school superintendent up-
held the principal's decision. On review, the Nebraska Supreme 
203. Gonzales v. McEuen, 43fi F. Supp. 460, 46fi (C.D. Cal. 1977); see also, Pitts-
burgh Bd. of Public Educ., fi24 A.2d 13R5, 13R9 (Pa. Commw. 19R7) (commingling 
of duties by attorneys in same law firm at due process hearing impermissible). 
204. !d. 
20fi. Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 4R2 F.2d 920, 927 (6th Cir. 19RR). 
206. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. fi6fi, fi79 (1975). 
207. !d. at fiR2. 
208. !d. 
209. See supra text accompanying notes 47-fiO. 
210. Walker v. Bradley, 320 N.W.2d 900, 900-01 (Neb. 19R2). 
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Court first commented that state statutes comported with the 
requirements for due process set forth in Goss v. Lopez,m 
and that the school had complied with statutory requirements, 
including the notice requirement.212 Specifically, the student 
and his parents had received actual notice of the date, time, 
place and circumstances of each prior violation.213 The court 
concluded that it was "utterly frivolous" for the student to deny 
that he received due process rights under the facts and circum-
stances of the case.214 
In a case with a similar result, a New Jersey student al-
leged that prior to a hearing resulting in a 10-day suspension, 
he should have been advised that he was also in jeopardy of 
being suspended from athletics for 60 days.:m The Third Cir-
cuit rejected the argument because student handbooks and 
other materials available to the student, combined with com-
mon sense, should have warned the student of potential sus-
pension from activities for misbehavior.216 
In West Virginia, an eighth-grade student, suspended for 
three days for accumulating ten demerits, 217 argued that she 
should have been given notice that on appeal, the school board 
would use its own standard to determine whether the suspen-
sion should be upheld rather than the standard applied at an 
earlier review by the teacher-student appeals council.218 The 
court found that previously published board regulations, wheth-
er actually seen by the student and her parents or not, and the 
fact that the student was orally advised at the board hearing of 
the standards to be applied, constituted adequate compliance 
with the Goss decision's notice requirements.219 
In another decision involving the adequacy of notice, sever-
al high school students argued that the information regarding 
suspension procedures included in the high school student 
handbook did not detail the specific steps that would be taken 
to effectuate the notice-hearing process. 220 The court held 
211. ld. at 902. 
212. ld. 
213. ld. 
214. ld. 
215. Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 94 (3d Cir. 1989). 
216. ld. 
217. E.f!., not being prepared for class. 
218. Kirtley v. Armentrout, 405 F. Supp. 575, fi76-77 (W.D. Va. 197fi). 
219. ld. at fi77 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 56fi, fi82 (197fi)). The court com-
mented that the student easily could have obtained the school board regulations 
which included the appeal standard. 
220. White v. Salisbury Township Sch. Dist., fi88 F. Supp. 608, 614 (E.D. Pa. 
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that there are no constitutional provisions that require a school 
district to publish specific procedural safeguards that closely 
regulate what takes place at hearings. 221 If a state requires 
specificity through the regulatory process, any failure to comply 
would violate only state law.222 Several courts have rejected 
parents' arguments that they are entitled to notice before their 
children are given short-term suspensions.22a 
2. Long-term suspensions or expulsions 
The Supreme Court in Goss did not address long-term 
suspensions or expulsions other than to suggest that "more 
formal procedures" than those stipulated in its ruling on short-
term suspensions may be required. 224 In 1961, the Fifth Cir-
cuit had addressed the specific requirements of due process for 
college students facing expulsion or long-term suspension.225 
That decision was subsequently considered a "landmark deci-
sion" by the Court in Goss v. Lopez.226 The Fifth Circuit held 
that before a student can be expelled from a public college for 
misconduct, the student must receive notice and an opportunity 
for a hearing.227 The court specified that notice to the student 
must be in writing and include a statement of the charges 
specific enough to allow the student to prepare a defense. 228 
A subsequent ruling on the issue by a federal district court in 
Alabama found that students do not have to be found guilty of 
all the charges contained in a notice in order to be subjected to 
discipline.229 If only one of the charges in the notice is proved 
on the record, the student may be disciplined.230 
Although the Fifth Circuit's decision pertained to expulsion 
of college students, a number of courts have followed that rul-
ing in applying due process to high school students. A Texas 
federal district court in 1981 commented, in its consideration of 
19R4). 
221. ld. 
222. ld. 
223. E.g., Boster v. Philpot, 64fi F. Supp. 79R, R07-08 (D. Kan. 19R6); Boynton v. 
Casey, fi43 F. Supp. 99fi (D. Me. 19R2). 
224. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. fi65, 5R4 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
22fi. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. 
denied, 86R U.S. 9::10 (1961). 
226. 419 U.S. fi6fi, fi76 (197fi). 
227. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 158. 
228. ld. at lfiR-159. 
229. Scott v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 168, 166 (M.D. Ala. 
1969). 
280. ld. at 167. 
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due process requirements for an eighth-grade student who had 
received a long-term suspension, that the same concepts, in-
cluding written notice specifying the charges, were to be ap-
plied to all students facing lengthy suspensions from public 
high schools.231 
In another decision, a high school student who had been 
expelled for gross misconduct, disobedience, and disrespece32 
argued on appeal that various aspects of the notice require-
ment were inadequate.233 The Supreme Court of Illinois held 
that two days' notice was adequate time for preparation for the 
expulsion hearing and notice that the hearing issues involved a 
pattern of misbehavior without giving details was adequate 
since school officials had previously informed the parents of 
each instance of misconduct. 234 
A written notice may not be required in some circumstanc-
es. The Supreme Court of Vermont concluded in the case of a 
long-term suspension or expulsion that it is not constitutionally 
required that a student receive written notice even when such 
notice was required by the school's own regulations. 235 On the 
facts of the decision, a high school student had admitted to 
school officials both on the date of the incident and at a subse-
quent hearing, that he had sold marijuana to another stu-
dent.236 Relying on the concept that procedural due process is 
flexible, the court determined that because the boy had not 
been prejudiced or treated unfairly, and that both the student 
and his father had been provided actual notice of the charges, 
written notice was not required.237 
A decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit involved a high school student who had been 
suspended initially for 10 days until such time that an expul-
sion hearing could be held on a charge of his bringing a gun to 
school. At the hearing, held after the student had missed three 
months of school, the boy was suspended for the next school 
year.238 The Second Circuit ruled that the student was not 
231. Diggles v. Corsicana Indep. Sch. Dist., 529 F. Supp. 169, 172, 173 (N.D. 
Tex. 1981) (holding the student had received adequate notice). 
232. Stratton v. Wenona Unif. Dist. No. 1, 526 N.E.2d 201, 2m (III.App. 3 Dist. 
1988), rev'd, 551 N.E.2d 640 (Ill. 1990). 
233. Stratton v. Wenona Community Unit Dist. No. 1, 551 N.E.2d 640, 641 (Ill. 
1990). 
234. ld. at 648-49. 
235. Rutz v. Essex Junction Prudential Comm., 457 A.2d 1368, 187:1 (Vt. 1988). 
236. !d. at 1369-70. 
237. ld. at 1372-73. 
238. Rosa R. v. Connelly, 889 F.2d 435, 439 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 
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entitled to receive notice from the school that the time he was 
absent from school during the continuances would not be con-
sidered "time served."239 The court held that due process does 
not require that school officials provide, as a part of required 
notice, a detailed listing of all possible discipline that might be 
imposed.240 
A middle-school student, who was expelled for admitted 
possession of marijuana, was found not to have been denied 
due process or prejudiced even though he had not been pro-
vided, as a part of the notice requirement, a copy of the school's 
code of conduct outlining all of his rights. The student had, 
however, subsequently availed himself of the hearing proce-
dures provided by the school board.241 The court commented 
that even though the student did not receive a copy of the en-
tire code, he had not been prejudiced. This was especially true 
because he had recourse to three additional opportunities to 
present his case before the school board and the State Board of 
Education. 242 In another decision involving the lack of formal 
written hearing guidelines, a high school student, expelled from 
school for possession of marijuana, was found not to have been 
denied procedural due process.243 The court reasoned that ac-
tual notice was adequate, and the student's legal counsel had 
full opportunity to present testimony, offer evidence, and ask 
questions at the school board hearing. 244 
A Pennsylvania federal district court found that a high 
school student who received a thirty day disciplinary suspen-
sion was afforded due process when he was given almost three 
weeks notice of the charges prior to a scheduled board hearing 
even though he had not been given notice of each specific 
charge nor given notice of the specific school regulations under 
which he would be punished.245 The court concluded that a 
general but clearly stated notice of the charges was adequate 
because it was sufficient notice to enable the student to prepare 
a defense. 246 In another decision, a high school student who 
u.s. 941 (1990). 
239. !d. at 436. 
240. !d. 
241. Rucker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 517 A.2d 703, 705 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986). 
242. !d. 
243. M. v. Bd. of Educ. Ball-Chatham Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 5, 429 F. 
Supp. 288, 291 (S.D. Ill. 1977). 
244. !d. 
245. Alex v. Allen, 409 F. Supp. 379, 386-87 (W.D. Pa. 1976). 
246. !d. at 387. 
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was initially suspended for five days and then expelled for the 
balance of the school year after having the opportunity to be 
heard at three different hearings before three different bodies, 
was found to have received adequate notice.247 The court ap-
plied the three-part balancing test of Eldridge and concluded 
that the student was entitled to receive notice of charges ade-
quate in detail to prepare a defense, but he was not entitled to 
notice of charges "drawn with the specificity required for a 
criminal trial proceeding or a list of potential witnesses and a 
summary of their anticipated testimony."248 
Not all courts agree on the issue of specificity of notice. A 
California federal district court has ruled that when severe 
penalties, such as expulsion from school, are contemplated, 
constitutional due process requires that notice must "include a 
statement not only of the specific charge, but must also include 
the basic rights to be afforded the student: to be represented by 
counsel, to present evidence, and to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses."249 
The courts are generally consistent in finding that in order 
to be adequate, a hearing notice must specify the time and 
place of the hearing, even when the misconduct is admit-
ted.250 In one decision, high school students who had admit-
ted their misconduct to school officials were given a temporary 
suspension, in compliance with the requirements of Goss. 251 
However, when school officials allowed the suspension to ex-
tend indefinitely, it became, in effect, an expulsion, and the 
student's due process rights were violated because a written 
notice of a hearing scheduled at a reasonable time and place 
had not been provided. 252 
The courts are split over the issue of whether notice must 
include a list of potential witnesses and a summary of their 
likely testimony. The Fifth Circuit, citing a number of cases 
previously decided between 1961 and 1975, has ruled that 
providing a list of witnesses who are adverse to the student 
and a summary of their intended testimony has usually been 
held to be essential with regard to long-term suspensions.253 
247. Whiteside v. Kay, 446 F. Supp. 716, 720 (W.D. La. 1978). 
248. !d. at 721. 
249. GDnzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460, 467 (C.D. Cal. 1977). 
250. E.g., Strickland v. Inlow, 519 F.2d 744, 746 (1975); remanded, sub. nom, 
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
251. Darby v. Schoo, 544 F. Supp. 428, 430-31 (W.D. Mich. 1982). 
252. !d. at 488. 
253. Keough v. Tate County Bd. of Educ., 748 F.2d 1077, 1081-82 (5th Cir. 
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However, the court added that the process due is dependent 
upon the totality of the circumstances and engaged in a balanc-
ing of the factors involved.254 It held that providing a list of 
witnesses prior to a hearing is not required when an analysis 
of the relevant facts showed that the student was not material-
ly prejudiced at the hearing.255 A similar result occurred in a 
Louisiana federal district court. 256 The Supreme Court of Mis-
sissippi, however, came to a contrary conclusion.257 It deter-
mined that procedural due process was violated when school 
officials refused to provide the requested lists of names of wit-
nesses as provided in school rules designed to protect the con-
stitutional rights of the students.258 
E. What Kind of Hearing is Required? 
An essential requirement of procedural due process is the 
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way. Due process is 
not a technical concept with fixed elements.259 It is, by its 
very nature, a highly flexible legal concept. As a concept, due 
process attempts to balance the government's responsibility to 
provide procedural due process with the particular life, liberty, 
or property interest of the person involved. 
The federal district court in Nebraska explained the flexi-
bility of due process in a pre-Goss ruling.260 The court said 
that the requirements of due process vary with each situation 
because they involve a balancing test wherein a person's right, 
such as school attendance, is weighed against the government's 
authority, such as maintaining discipline in the schools. The 
court concluded that as the importance of a person's right in-
creases, the government must provide a correspondingly in-
1984). 
254. !d. 
255. !d. at 1082. In Nash v. Auburn Univ., 1112 F.2d 655, 66a (11th Cir. 19117), 
the court concluded that two veterinary medicine students who had been suspended 
for cheating on an anatomy examination were "in this academic disciplinary pro-
cess . . . not constitutionally entitled to advance notice of statements by witnesses 
who, along with the appellants [students who were alleged to have cheated on the 
examination], were to appear at the hearing." 
256. Whiteside v. Kay, 446 F. Supp. 716, 721 (W.D. La. 19711). 
257. Warren County Bd. of Educ. v. Wilkinson, 500 So.2d 455 (Miss. 1986). 
258. !d. at 460-61. 
259. E.g., McLain v. Lafayette County Bd. of Educ., 673 F.2d 106, 110 (.5th Cir. 
19112); White v. Salisbury Township Sch. Dist., 5118 F. Supp. 6011, 613 (E.D. Pa. 
1984). 
260. Graham v. Knutzen, 362 F. Supp. 881 (D. Neb. 19n!). 
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creasing amount of procedural due process.261 
Procedural due process does not speak to the merits or wis-
dom of a decision. It is intended only to help protect individuals 
from mistakes made by government officials.262 A number of 
courts have stated that the burden of providing due process is 
on the schools and that students are not responsible for re-
questing it. 263 
1. Admission of misconduct 
In a pre-Goss decision, the Ninth Circuit held that a high 
school student who admitted that he had assaulted another 
student was not entitled to a due process hearing on the 
grounds that he had admitted all the important facts that a 
due process hearing was supposed to establish.264 Thus, the 
fact that the student had not been allowed to have representa-
tion by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses or to present wit-
ness in his own behalf were not violations of his right to due 
process.265 In a more recent decision, a Maine student's alle-
gation that he was denied cross-examination during an expul-
sion hearing was rejected on the ground he had confessed his 
guilt to an administrator.266Upon admission of misconduct, 
another high school student, who had been immediately given a 
three-day in-school suspension and additional school restric-
tions,267 was found not to be entitled to notice or hearing.268 
In 1980, another federal district court concluded that an infor-
261. Id. at 883. 
262. Carey v. Piphus, 4:35 U.S. 247, 259 (1978). 
263. E.g. Gonzales V. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460, 469 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Fielder 
v. Board of Educ., 346 F. Supp. 722 (D. Neb. 1972). 
264. Black Coalition v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 
1973). 
265. !d. 
266. Carey v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 754 F. Supp. 906, 920 (D. Me. 
1990); see also McLain v. LaFayette County Bd. of Educ., 687 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 
1982), reh'g denied, 673 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1982) (inadequate notice of issues to be 
addressed at the hearing were not prejudicial as a result of the student's confes-
sion). 
267. Fentnn v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767, 769 (W.D. Pa. 1976). 
268. !d. at 771-72. The parent did in fact receive written notice but not the 
student. The incident occurred off campus in the evening when the student, while 
sitting in a car, noticed his teacher drive by, and proceeded to call him "a prick." 
At this hearing the teacher, who was the recipient of the unwanted remark, was 
not present and hence the student was denied the opportunity of cross-examina-
tion. Further the student was not allowed to present his own witnesses. The court 
concluded that since the student had admitted to the offensive remark he had not 
been denied due process even though the above mentioned procedural safeguards 
were not afforded. 
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mal hearing is not necessary regarding suspension or expulsion 
when a student admits his culpability.269 
Students who had admitted vandalizing school property 
and were then suspended for three days270 were held to have 
received due process.271 Relying on Goss,272 the district 
court concluded that once guilt is admitted, there is no need for 
students to present their versions of what had happened. 273 
Critical to this decision was the Goss requirement that stu-
dents must be given an explanation of the evidence and an 
opportunity to present their version of the situation if they 
deny the charges.274 The inference the court obtained was 
that if a student does not deny the charges, then neither an 
explanation of evidence by the school or an opportunity to be 
heard is required. 
A high school student who was wearing sunglasses in 
school, a violation of school rules, was given a one-day suspen-
sion and time in detention because she refused to remove her 
glasses and give them to the teacher. 275 The student admitted 
that she refused to obey the teacher's command.276 The court 
concluded that "when a student admits to the conduct [refusal 
to tum over glasses] giving rise to the suspension, the need for 
a due process hearing is obviated, since the purpose of a hear-
ing is to safeguard against punishment of students who are 
innocent of the accusations against them."277 A number of ad-
ditional cases support the contention that admission of guilt 
does not require any prior hearing. 278 
Only one court ruling has been found taking the opposite 
269. 
19HO). 
270. 
271. 
272. 
273. 
274. 
27fi. 
19H7). 
Montoya v. Sanger Unified Sch. Dist., 502 F. Supp. 209, 213 (E.D. Cal. 
Boster v. Philpot, 64fi F. Supp. 798, 800 (D. Kan. 1986). 
ld. at 804. 
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 56fi, fiH1 (197fi). 
Boster, 64fi F. Supp. at 805. 
Goss, 419 U.S. at 581. 
Cole v. Newton Special Mun. Sch. Dist., 676 F. Supp. 749, 7fi2 (S.D. Miss. 
276. ld. 
277. Id. The court relied on Black Coalition v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1, 484 
F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1973) and Montoya v. Sanger Unified Sch. Dist., 502 F. 
Supp. 209, 213 (E.D. Cal. 1980). 
27H. E.g., Hillman v. Elliott, 436 F. Supp. 812, 81fi (D.W.V. 1977); Long v. 
Thornton Township High Sch. Dist., fi2 F.R.D. 186 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Coffman v. 
Kuehler, 409 F. Supp. fi46, fi50 (N.D. Tex., 1976); Abremski v. Southeastern Sch. 
Dist., 421 A.2d 485, 487 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980); Birdsey v. Grand Blanc Commu-
nity Sch., 344 N.W. 2d 342, 346 (Mich. App. 1983); Greenspan v. Antin, 423 
N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (1979), affd 433 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. 1980). 
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view. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit has held that students have the right to present their 
views of the misconduct at a hearing, even when they admit 
the offense.279 The Eighth Circuit relied on the then recent 
Goss statement that "things are not always as they seem to be, 
and the student will at least have the opportunity to character-
ize his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper con-
text."280 
A fair reading of Goss might require that a hearing be held 
in some circumstances regardless of admission of guilt or school 
official observation of misconduct by the student. Those situa-
tions would exist when the student does not deny his or her 
action, but may have a justifiable or mitigating reason for the 
misconduct. Such might be the situation, for example, when a 
student is observed hitting another student, but can claim that 
he or she was struck by the other student first. 
2. Short-term suspensions 
For short-term suspensions the Supreme Court in Goss 
stated that a student must be afforded at least a rudimentary 
hearing.281 The Court clearly indicated that it did not want to 
unduly burden public education by imposing elaborate detailed 
due process elements in each situation.282 In fact, the Court 
indicated that the hearing need only be "an informal give-and-
take discussion between the student and the disciplinari-
an."283 These rudimentary hearings will typically occur imme-
diately following the misconduct, but prior to suspension. The 
Court acknowledged, however, that emergency situations may 
occur that will force a hearing to follow a suspension after a 
reasonable amount of time. 284 
The rudimentary hearing is intended to provide the school 
279. Strickland v. Inlow, fi19 F.2d 744, 746 (8th Cir. 197fi). Three female tenth 
grade students admitted that they had spiked the punch at an extracurricular 
function in violation of school regulations. 
280. ld. (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at fi84). The Court in Goss acknowledged that 
"[r]equiring that there be at least an informal give-and-take between student and 
disciplinarian, preferably prior to the suspension, will add little to the factfinding 
function where the disciplinarian himself has witnessed the conduct forming the 
basis for the charge. But things are not always as they seem to be ... " 
281. Goss, 419 U.S. at fi79. 
282. ld. at fi80. 
283. ld. at 584. 
284. ld. at fi82. Under certain emergency circumstances a student may be imme-
diately removed from school. A "hearing should follow as soon as practicable." Id. 
at fi82-583. 
1] WHAT PROCESS IS DUE 37 
official with an opportunity to inform the student of alleged 
misconduct and to give the student an opportunity to explain 
his or her version of the situation.285 Additional procedural 
safeguards beyond notice and a rudimentary hearing286 were 
not required, although the Court noted that school officials had 
discretion to afford additional procedures if the situation war-
ranted.287 The court noted that a school official might find it 
necessary to "summon the accuser, permit cross examina-
tion, ... allow the student to present his own 
witnesses .... [and even] permit counsel" in an effort to avoid 
error.288 
The general due process requirement that the hearing 
"must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner"289 appears to be totally at the discretion of school 
officials. In Goss, the Court assumed that the school official 
would usually conduct the hearing immediately after providing 
notice. 290 Allowing the student a delay between notice and 
hearing would, the Court feared, unduly formalize the ad-
versarial nature of the proceeding. 291 The Court reasoned 
that delay would be too costly and destructive to the education-
al process.292 The ruling in Goss was an obvious effort to 
strike a balance between school officials possibly making a 
mistake in erroneously suspending a student and the added 
burden of a full due process hearing to administration of public 
schools. 
In a ruling subsequent to Goss, a federal district court in 
Illinois had before it a situation involving a boy who had been 
suspended for 10 days for possession of a knife in school.293 
The principal met informally with the boy and discussed the 
situation before imposing the suspension. The boy's parents 
requested and received a hearing before the local board and the 
board upheld the suspension.294 The parents' suit alleged vio-
lation of procedural due process on the grounds that their son 
285. !d. at 580-81. 
286. Goss, v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 582. 
287. !d. at 583-584. 
288. !d. 
289. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). 
290. Goss, 419 U.S. at 582. 
291. !d. at 58::1. 
292. !d. 
293. Reineman v. Valley View Community Sch. Dist. No. ::l6fi-U, 527 F. Supp. 
661, 663 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
294. !d. 
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had not been allowed to confront or cross-examine witnesses 
against him and had not been allowed to make a verbatim 
recording of the hearings.295 The court noted that the Goss 
decision had expressly declined to require full-scale hearings 
for short-tenn suspensions and required no more than rudi-
mentary hearings such as those provided by the principal and 
board. The court found that appropriate due process had been 
afforded the boy through "a mere informal encounter between 
the student and disciplinary authority.'>296 
The federal district court in Maine was faced with the 
suspension and subsequent expulsion of a student for use of 
marijuana on school property.297 The student's parents al-
leged their son's due process rights had been violated because 
the principal denied him pennission to leave school during the 
time he was being questioned by the principal. Moreover, the 
parents alleged that the student was not infonned of his right 
to remain silent, was not notified that he could have his par-
ents present during questioning and his parents were not noti-
fied at the time of the questioning.298 The court found no le-
gal basis in the parents' allegations and upheld the procedures 
used by the principal in the suspension.299 
3. What "unusual situations" call for more than rudimentary 
procedures? 
The Sixth Circuit addressed the meaning of "unusual situ-
ations," referred to in Goss,300 that would call for more than 
rudimentary due process procedures for short-term suspen-
sions.301 In the decision, an eighth-grade student was sus-
pended for 10 days for possession of a drug look-alike. The 
student's parents argued that the drug-associated charge was 
stigmatizing and had a hannful effect on a student's reputa-
tion,302 and that therefore the Mathews v. Eldridge303 bal-
ancing test should be applied instead of Goss' rudimentary 
requirements of notice and hearing. The court concluded that 
295. ld. at 665. 
296. ld; see also Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir. 1987) (find-
ing that an informal discussion of charges was adequate for seven-day suspension). 
297. Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995, 996 (D. Me. 1982). 
298. ld. at 997. 
299. ld. at 998. 
300. Goss, 419 U.S. at 584. 
301. Paredes v. Curtis, 864 F.2d 426, 427 (6th Cir. 1988). 
302. ld. at 428. 
303. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1975). 
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the case did not present an unusual situation but was precisely 
the type of school situation the Goss standard was meant to ad-
dress.304 
A seventh-grade student who refused to attend a required 
physical education class was suspended from school until such 
time as she would participate in the class. 305 Various meet-
ings of school officials and school board members were held 
with the father and daughter without resolution.306 By the 
time the action was filed in federal district court, the student 
had missed about six weeks of school due to the indefinite 
suspension and the student's voluntary non-attendance.307 
The court noted that school officials were confronted with a 
disciplinary problem and not a truancy problem; the student 
had been only suspended and not expelled from school.308 The 
court held that proper notice and hearing had been afforded the 
father and daughter at an initial hearing and that the extenu-
ating circumstances of the voluntary non-attendance did not 
change that result.309 
In a situation arising in Texas, a junior high school stu-
dent who had been adjudicated a delinquent was ordered to 
attend school, but was subsequently suspended from school for 
various forms of misconduct.310 A modification hearing on his 
delinquency was held within four weeks of the suspension, and 
the student argued that the modification order committing him 
to the state detention school should be rescinded because he 
had been denied due process in his suspension from schooP11 
Though the student's suspension from school had exceeded ten 
days at the time of the modification hearing, the court noted 
that the student would have been readmitted to school earlier 
if his mother would have requested a conference with school 
teachers and officials.312 The court concluded that the evi-
dence did not establish that the student was absent longer 
than ten days from school by other than his own choice.313 
304. !d. at 429. The court continued: "Therefore, we decline the invitation to ap-
ply the Mathews balancing test and instead will apply the Goss standard in resolv-
ing both of Paredes' procedural due process contentions." 
305. Ouimette v. Babbie, 405 F. Supp. 525, 526 (D. Vt. 197fi). 
306. !d. at 526-28. 
307. !d. 
308. !d. at fi28. 
309. !d. at fi29. 
310. In the Matter of J.L.D., 536 S.W.2d 68fi, 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). 
311. !d. 
312. !d. at 687. 
313. !d. at 688. 
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The court found therefore that no additional due process was 
required and that school officials had met the minimal notice 
and hearing requirements specified in Goss for short-term sus-
pensions.314 
The Fifth Circuit reviewed a decision involving a suspen-
sion during the time of scheduled final examinations. In Keo-
ugh v. Tate County Board of Education, the Fifth Circuit noted 
that no distinction was made in Goss between suspensions 
occurring during examination periods and those occurring at 
other times.315 The court concluded that although final ex-
aminations are important to a student's grade and have a long-
term effect on a student's life, they are not materially different 
from examinations that take place throughout the semes-
ter.316 To exclude final examination periods from the ruling in 
Goss and requiring more formal proceedings would significantly 
undermine its meaning.317 
In another decision, a high school senior who admitted he 
had consumed whiskey while attending a school outing was 
suspended for three days.318 The suspensions happened to co-
incide with examinations.319 As a result, the student failed 
three courses and did not graduate.320 The student argued be-
fore the Seventh Circuit that he was in effect expelled rather 
than suspended and claimed that he was entitled to procedural 
due process in addition to that required in Goss.321 The Sev-
enth Circuit was in agreement with the Fifth Circuit's discus-
sion above322 and concluded that the student received legally 
required process due.323 The court noted that the student 
would have graduated without taking final examinations if his 
grades had been high enough and concluded that the action 
taken was not really an expulsion despite the long-term and 
harsh effects of the timing of his misconduct.324 In a state 
court decision, a student who was suspended from school for 
314. !d. 
315. 748 F.2d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 1984). 
316. ld. 
317. ld. The court noted that the student was eventually allowed to take his 
final examinations. 
318. Lamb v. Panhandle Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 2, 826 F.2d 526, 527 
(7th Cir. 1987). 
319. ld. 
320. ld. 
321. ld. at 529. 
322. See supra text accompanying notes 315-17. 
323. Lamb, 826 F.2d at 529. 
324. !d. 
1 
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three days, and consequently missed an important test, needed 
only be afforded rudimentary due process.325 
A high school student who received both a ten-day academ-
ic suspension and a 60-day athletic suspension was held not to 
be entitled to any more procedural safeguards than that re-
quired for only a 10-day suspension.326 The Third Circuit 
found that the student was not entitled to a second notice and 
hearing for the athletic suspension, even though he had not 
been advised in the initial notice or hearing that he might be 
subject to suspension from athletics as an additional penalty 
for his misconduct. The court ruled that Goss requires only 
notice of alleged misconduct and its evidentiary basis, but does 
not require that a statement of all potential penalties be in-
cluded.327 
The Third Circuit also held that the student was not enti-
tled to additional due process even though he faced the cumula-
tive effect of both an academic and an athletic suspension. 3~8 
The court applied the Eldridge balancing test and concluded 
that requiring different types of due process - one for athletes 
and another for all other students -would be unduly disrup-
tive. 329 The minimal due process procedures required by Goss 
were found to be sufficient under the circumstances.330 
To date, courts have not identified any "unusual situations" 
calling for procedural safeguards in addition to those minimally 
required in Goss. 331 The unusual situation would seem to re-
quire that a student suffer a severe penalty not reasonably 
contemplated by a ten day suspension or restrictions on extra-
curricular activities. Such an unusual situation it might be 
conjectured, could involve a student being denied a scholarship 
award or admission to a college or military academy as a result 
of a notation of discipline on a student's record. 
4. Expulsions and long-term suspensions 
In Goss, the Supreme Court did not expressly state what 
additional safeguards would be afforded students who are sub-
325. Wayne County Bd. of Educ. v. Tyre, 404 S.E.2d 809, 810-11 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1991). 
326. Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1989). 
327. ld. at 96 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582 (1975)). 
328. ld. at 95. 
329. ld. at 96. 
330. ld. at 95. 
331. Goss, 419 U.S. at 584. 
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ject to suspensions longer than ten days or to expulsions. The 
majority of the Court merely indicated that "more formal proce-
dures" may be required.332 Recently, the federal district court 
in Maine, after considering the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing 
test, reiterated its list of minimum procedural safeguards to be 
used when student disciplinary hearings are conducted.333 
Those requirements are: 
(1) The student must be advised of the charges against him; 
(2) the student must be informed of the nature of the evidence 
against him; 
(3) the student must be given an opportunity to be heard in 
his own defense; 
(4) the student must not be punished except on the basis of 
substantial evidence; 
(5) the student must be permitted the assistance of a lawyer 
in major disciplinary hearings; 
(6) the student must be permitted to confront and to cross-
examine the witnesses against him; 
(7) the student has the right to an impartial tribunal. 334 
Providing perhaps a startling contrast to this list of mini-
mum requirements is a recent Sixth Circuit's opinion wherein 
the court held that due process does not require that a student 
be allowed to cross-examine or even know the identities of stu-
dents who accused him of selling marijuana, to cross-examine 
school officials, or to attend closed deliberations held by the 
school board even though prosecuting school officials were pres-
ent.335 The Sixth Circuit also relied on the Mathews v. 
Eldridge test, which was characterized as providing for a "flexi-
ble, policy-oriented analysis of procedural due process is-
sues."336 
Granted, as outlined previously, that notice and hearing 
are required, the question remains what other procedural due 
process safeguards are constitutionally required in order to 
ensure a fair hearing with respect to expulsions or suspensions 
332. !d. 
333. Carey v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 754 F. Supp. 906, 918-19 (D. Me. 
1990). 
334. !d. at 919 (quoting Keene v. Rodgers, 316 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D. Me. 1970)). 
The court in footnote 7 added: "Although the Court spoke on this issue prior to 
the landmark Supreme Court precedents governing this subject, the Court's deci-
sion is consistent with those precedents and, therefore, retains its vitality." 
335. Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 924 (6th Cir. 1988). 
336. !d. 
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longer than ten days. 
a. The right of confrontation and cross-examination 
The United States Suprem,3 Court in Goss all but eliminat-
ed the right to confrontation and cross-examination of witness-
es for short-term suspensions, with the possible exception that 
an "unusual situation" may require something more than mini-
mal due process procedures.337 The Court was silent regard-
ing the process required for longer suspensions or expul-
sions, 338 and it has been the lower federal courts that have 
attempted to determine the law on this point. 
At least one federal district court, relying on the Goss deci-
sion, offered students facing expulsion a complete panoply of 
procedural safeguards, including the right of confrontation and 
cross-examination of adverse witnesses.339 The court inferred 
from Goss that the rights to have counsel present and to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses were required because of the 
severe nature of the penalty of expulsion,340 especially when 
heresay evidence was involved.341 In 1990, the federal district 
court in Maine, after considering the three-factor balancing test 
of Mathews v. Eldridge, included among its minimum procedur-
al safeguards for expulsion, the right of a student to confront 
and cross-examine the witnesses presented against him at the 
hearing.342 However, because the student admitted the 
charge of bringing an automatic weapon to school, the lack of 
cross-examination had no bearing on the decision. 343 
In a case before the Eighth Circuit, a school board had 
refused to allow a student being considered for expulsion to 
cross-examine the teacher who had brought two charges 
against him. 344 The district court had balanced the competing 
interests of effective school administration with the protection 
:~37. Goss, 419 U.S. at fi83-84 (indicating that a school official could "permit 
cross-examination, and allow the student to present his own witnesses" if the 
school official chose such action). 
338. !d. 
339. Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460, 467 (C.D. Cal 1977). 
340. !d. 
341. !d. at 469. 
342. Carey v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 7fi4 F. Supp. 906, 918-19 (D. Me. 
1990). 
34a. !d. at 920; see supm text accompanying notes 263-279. 
344. Dillon v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., fi94 F.2d 699, 700 (8th Cir. 
1979) (the charges were public display of affection on school grounds, and failure to 
comply with reasonable commands of teachers). 
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of the student's entitlement to an education under state law 
and concluded that even expulsion proceedings could have some 
limits on confrontation, such as anonymity for student accusers 
who might be the victim of reprisals.345 However, as in the 
instant case, when a teacher brought the charges and was 
present at the hearing, the minor loss of time for her testimony 
and cross-examination did not weigh heavily against the stude-
nt's loss of an education. The court therefore ruled that the 
student should have been allowed to cross-examine the teach-
er.346 The ruling was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit, and one 
judge, in a concurring opinion, stated that the rationale of Goss 
required that the student be allowed to cross-examine the teac-
her as to the facts of the situation.347 
A number of court decisions are in agreement, partially be-
cause of state statutory or local rule requirements based on 
constitutional concepts. In a decision involving a student who 
lost a semester's academic credit because she had a few sips of 
beer in her home before school on the last day of a school 
term,348 the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the school 
board's decision because the school had not complied with its 
own rules which required the right to confront and cross-exam-
ine witnesses against students charged with misconduct.349 
Several other courts have ruled that schools must provide 
the right to cross-examine students where state statutes have 
established that right. One state court has ruled that a school 
board is required to examine the evidence and not merely rely 
on school officials' reports when evidence is conflicting and 
when it has not been shown that available witnesses are at 
risk of being harmed if they testify.350 The court added that it 
would be appropriate for the board to rely on hearsay reports 
only when it is established that the disclosure of the witness' 
identity would subject the witness to retaliation.351 The court 
345. Dillon v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 468 F. Supp fi4, fi8 (E.D. Ark. 
1978). 
346. ld. 
347. Dillon, 594 F.2d at 700-01 (Benson, Chief Dist. J., concurring). 
348. Warran County Bd. of Educ. v. Wilkinson, fiOO So.2d 4fifi, 4fi6 (Miss. 1986); 
contra Jones v. Pascaqoula Mun. Sep. Sch. Dist., fi24 So.2d 968, 973 (Miss. 1988) 
(noting that the issue of testimony from school employees may be treated different-
ly). 
349. ld. at 460-61. 
350. John A. v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist, 6fi4 P.2d 242, 246-47 
(Cal. 1983). 
351. ld. at 246. The court referenced Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 417, 482 
(1972) (stating that with regard to a parole violation hearing, a hearing officer may 
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apparently would require that there be an express finding of 
risk before witnesses would be considered unavailable.352 A 
similar result was reached in Florida when a state appeals 
court held that a high school student could not be expelled 
based exclusively on hearsay evidence.353 State statute re-
quired that hearsay evidence could be used only to substantiate 
other evidence and could not be the exclusive evidence present-
ed. 
Some courts have reached contrary results on the right of 
cross-examination. One federal district court, after balancing 
the Mathews v. Eldridge factors, concluded contrary to some of 
the above rulings, that the burden and cost to school officials 
outweighed any risk of error. The court held that the school 
board was not required to conduct full-scale hearings with 
cross-examination and provision of a list of witnesses with a 
summary of their testimony and discovery prior to expelling 
students for the remainder of the school year.354 With regard 
to the "guilt phase of suspension hearings,"355 the Fifth Cir-
cuit has declined to formalize the suspension process by requir-
ing school administrators to establish a basis in fact as to the 
accuracy of each piece of evidence considered at a hearing.356 
Written statements of three unidentified students implicating 
the charged student with use and sale of drugs at school that 
were read at the hearing were sufficiently specific regarding 
the student's use of and dealing in drugs and thus constituted 
a sufficient form of confrontation.357 
A similar result was found in a decision of the Sixth Cir-
cuit involving a high school student accused of possession and 
sale of a marijuana cigarette.358 At a hearing before the 
school board, the student was denied permission to learn the 
names of and cross-examine student accusers or to cross-exam-
ine the principal and superintendent359 who had conducted 
the investigation, imposed sanctions, and relayed their results 
determine that if "the informant would be subjected to risk of harm if his identity 
were disclosed, he need not be subjected to confrontation and cross-examination"). 
~152. lei. at 24 7. 
:153. Franklin v. Dist. Sch. Bd. of Hendry County, :156 So. 2d 9:31, 9:12 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
354. Whiteside v. Kay, 446 F. Supp. 716, 720-21 (W.D. La. 1976). 
355. Brewer v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 261-63 (5th Cir. 1985). 
356. Id. at 263. 
357. Id. 
358. Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 921 (6th Cir. 1988). 
359. Id. at 922. 
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of the investigation to the board. 360 The court was satisfied 
that the superintendent and principal used only reliable infor-
mation provided by the informants in their earlier administra-
tive decision to expel the student. 361 
In reaching its decision, the Sixth Circuit applied the Mat-
hews test and determined that allowing the accused student to 
know and cross-examine his student accusers was outweighed 
by the necessity of protecting student witnesses from repri-
sal.362 The need to protect the school environment against the 
increasingly serious problem of drug use and violent crime,363 
coupled with the need to protect student-informants from repri-
sal, was determined essential in order to protect students who 
are willing to report offenses by their fellow students.364 The 
value of the additional procedural safeguard- an opportunity 
to confront and cross-examine student-informants - was not 
found to be sufficiently compelling because school officials 
would be able to evaluate the veracity of incriminating state-
ments provided by other students.365 
The Sixth Circuit assumed that cross-examination of the 
student witness would duplicate the original assessment un-
dertaken by the investigating school administrator.366 With 
regard to cross-examination of the school administrators, the 
court concluded that allowing their cross-examination was too 
heavy a burden when weighed against the small benefit the 
student would receive.367 Also, in applying the Mathews bal-
ancing test, the court recognized that allowing cross-examina-
tion of school administrators would interfere with their normal 
duties as they worked to become familiar with legal principles 
involving cross-examination.368 The court reasoned that 
school board members should not be diverted from their prima-
360. !d. at 921. The principal recommended a ten-day suspension and the super-
intendent expelled the student for the balance of the fall semester. 
361. !d. at 921-22. 
362. !d. at 925. The Sixth Circuit also reached the same conclusion in Paredes 
v. Curtis, 864 F.2d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that the student-plaintiff who 
had been suspended for ten days did not have the right of cross-examination of the 
student-informant when such right was denied in Newsome, H42 F.2d at 925, which 
was an expulsion case). 
363. !d., (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) which, in turn, 
cited a 197R report to the U.S. Congress). 
364. !d. 
365. !d. 
366. !d. 
367. !d. at 925. 
36R. !d. at 925-26. 
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ry goal of educating young people to assume a new responsibili-
ty of a "quasi judicial" body and perform a role they are not 
well equipped to perform.369 The court clearly stated that 
school boards should not have to follow all the formal rules of 
evidence in hearings.370 
A Wisconsin state appellate court has taken a similar posi-
tion of balancing and has held that allowing hearsay state-
ments of students not present at the hearing and not subject to 
cross-examination did not violate a student's right to due pro-
cess. 371 The court stated that a school board made up of non-
attorneys should not be expected to follow the requirements of 
the hearsay rule.372 In the absence of a showing that the tea-
cher witnesses had reason to lie, hearsay statements should be 
allowed, at least in part, to serve as the basis for the board 
decision.373 
b. When is counsel required? 
Rudimentary hearings for short-term suspensions, absent 
an unusual situation, do not require schools to allow the stu-
dent to secure legal counsel.374 However, such procedures 
may be required for expulsions or suspensions longer than ten 
days375 though the Supreme Court declined to expressly elab-
orate. The Third Circuit has held that only minimal due pro-
cess was required where a student was suspended for 10 days 
and also received a 60-day athletic suspension.376 The court 
specifically declined to require the right to counsel.377 Recent-
ly, the federal district court in Maine stated that students must 
be allowed legal assistance in major disciplinary hearings, but 
noted that in the situation before it that the student had been 
not denied that opportunity.378 A federal district court in Pen-
nsylvania ruled that there is no right to an attorney or a right 
369. ld. 
370. ld. at 926, (citing Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 492 F.2d 697, 701 (5th 
Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1974)). 
371. Racine Unified Sch. Dist. v. Thompson, 331 N.W.2d 334, 337 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1982). 
372. 
373. 
374. 
375. 
376. 
377. 
ld. at 337-38. 
!d. at 338. 
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975). 
ld. at 584. 
Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1989). 
!d. 
378. Carey v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 754 F. Supp. 906, 919 (D. Me. 
1990). 
(: 
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to an attorney at school expense in a situation involving an 
involuntary transfer of a student between attendance centers 
for disciplinary reasons. 379 
In general, most courts reviewing student due process 
issues since Goss have not needed to address the right to coun-
sel. The schools had allowed or encouraged legal representation 
when long-term suspension or expulsion were involved.380 
c. Other due process elements 
The foregoing discussion of procedural due process ele-
ments represents those which are commonly at issue in court 
reviews of procedural due process. However, there are several 
other issues that arise on a less frequent basis. 
Inherent in the requirements of notice and an opportunity 
to respond is the requirement that decisions be based only on 
the evidence produced at the hearing. In an important case 
before the Sixth Circuit, a school board decision to expel a 
student was reversed because the superintendent revealed new 
evidence during board deliberations after the hearing was con-
cluded.381 The court concluded that such an action deprived 
the student of his required opportunity to rebut the evi-
dence.382 It was discovered that the superintendent had given 
false information to the board.383 
379. Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. Supp. 397, 401-02 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
380. Allegations of denial of procedural due process involving expulsion typically 
have had representation by counsel or were afforded the opportunity to be repre-
sented by counsel. For example, in John A. v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. 
Dist., 64fi P.2d 242, 244 (Cal. 1983), school officials, when informing parents of the 
scheduled hearing also advised them that they be represented hy counsel. In 
Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., R42 F.2d 920, 921 (6th Cir. 19RR), the stu-
dent was represented by counsel at a hearing before the school board. Other deci-
sions wherein there was representation by counsel include: Dillon v. Pulaski Coun-
ty Special Sch. Dist., 46R F. Supp. fi4, 56 (E.D. Ark. 197H); Draper v. Columbus 
Pub. Sch., 760 F. Supp. 131, 132 (S.D Ohio 1991); Jones v. Pascaqoula Mun. Sepa-
rate Sch. Dist., 524 So.2d 968, 969 (Miss. 19R8); Lamb v. Panhandle Community 
Unif. Sch. Dist. No. 2, R26 F.2d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 19R7) (three day suspension); 
Ouimette v. Babbie, 405 F. Supp. 525, fi26 (D. Vt. 197fi) (suspended until student 
attends physical education class); Paredes v. Curtis, R64 F.2d 426, 42R (6th Cir. 
1988) (ten day suspension); Smith v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., fiR2 F. Supp 1fi9, 160 
(E.D. Ark. 1984); Sykes v. Sweeney, 638 F. Supp. 274, 27R (E.D. Mo. 19R6); 
Whiteside v. Kay, 446 F. Supp. 716, 721 (W.D. La. 197R). 
3Rl. Newsome, 842 F.2d at 927. 
382. ld. at 92R; see also Carey v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 7fi4 F. Supp. 
906, 919 (D. Me. 1990) (included in a list of due process rights); De Jesus v. 
Penberty, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972) (a pre-Goss ruling holding that a deci-
sion must be based only on evidence introduced at hearing). 
383. ld., n. 7. 
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Court decisions are divided on the issue of requiring a 
written decision in long-term suspensions. One view states 
written decisions require the decision maker to weigh the evi-
dence more heavily, and in a balance of competing interests, 
the student should be provided a written decision.384 In the 
other view, no reason justifying the requirement of a written 
decision has been identified. 385 
One court has ruled that due process does not require that 
witnesses at expulsion hearings be swom to tell the truth or 
that formal rules of evidence be followed. 386 The requirement 
of such additional procedures would result in a significant 
burden being placed on the school without providing any addi-
tional important protection against error.387 Several courts 
ruled that due process in the school setting does not require 
the right to appeal a decision to a higher authority.388 While 
pre-Goss rulings were split on the issue of requiring a verbatim 
record of hearings,389 no post-Goss ruling on the issue has 
been identified. 
V. CURING DEFECTS IN PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
Many school officials have determined after the fact that a 
particular student may not have been afforded appropriate 
procedural due process. Some have proceeded with a "let the 
chips fall where they may" attitude, but others have taken a 
constructive approach to the problem. One such approach 
would involve the removal from the student's record of all men-
tion of the previous faulty hearing and any discipline rendered, 
thus placing the student in the same position he or she faced 
before the faulty hearing was held. A second hearing could 
then be held with procedural defects cured. While no court has 
expressly ruled that such an approach is legal in the context of 
384. Takeall v. Ambach, 609 F. Supp 81, 85-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Carey v. Maine 
Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 754 F. Supp. 906, 920 (D. Me. 1990); see pre-Goss rul-
ings requiring a written decision in Fielder v. Board of Educ. 346 F. Supp. 722 (D. 
Neb. 1972); De Jesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972). 
381i. Long v. Thornton Township High Sch. Dist. 201i, 82 F.R.D. 186, 192 (N.D. 
Ill. 1979); see also pre-Goss ruling in Linwood v. Board of Educ., 463 F.2d 763 (7th 
Cir. 1972) (holding that a written decision not required). 
386. Sykes v. Sweeney, 688 F. Supp. 274, 279 (E.D. Mo. 1986). 
887. ld. 
38R. Brewer v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 263 (lith Cir. 19Rii); 
Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. Supp. 397, 403 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
889. E.g., Pierce v. School Committee, 822 F. Supp. 91i7 (D. Mass. 1971) (ver-
batim record not required); Fielder v. Board of Educ. 346 F. Supp. 722 m. Neb. 
1972) (verbatim record was required). 
.. ~·, 
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school discipline, several courts have implicitly upheld the 
curing of earlier procedural defects through subsequent hear-
ings. 
In a case before the Eighth Circuit, a local school board 
had suspended three girls for three months for allegedly !Spik-
ing the punch at a school event. 390 The board had not pro-
vided the girls or their parents with proper notice of the hear-
ing at which the initial decision was made and held a second 
hearing about two weeks later in which the notice defects were 
corrected.391 Without expressly ruling on the issue of cured 
defects, the court ruled that the second hearing procedure was 
faulty because the school board had distributed a written state-
ment of its finding of facts before the second hearing had be-
gun. Because the record did not establish that the board actual-
ly considered the discipline issue anew, the court found that 
the second hearing had not, in fact, cured the procedural de-
fects.392 
In a situation before a Virginia federal district court, a 
student was suspended for three days for being disrespectful 
toward a teacher and using abusive language.393 When uncer-
tainty arose about the legality of the procedures used, the 
school allowed the student to remain in school and began the 
disciplinary process anew. The student was offered all required 
procedures.394 The court ruled that the initial defects did not 
taint the later proceedings and the student had been afforded 
proper due process.395 A similar result occurred in a Texas 
case where procedural defects in a rudimentary suspension 
hearing were found to have been corrected by a second hearing 
two hours later with the student's father. 396 A pre-Goss ruling 
in Louisiana also upheld the use of a second hearing to cure a 
procedural defect and stated that the amount of time lapse 
between the first hearing and the curative hearing was not 
important. 397 
390. Strickland v. Inlow, 519 F.2d 744, 746 (8th Cir. 1975). 
391. ld. 
392. ld. 
393. Hillman v. Elliott, 436 F. Supp. 812, 814 (W.D. Va. 1977). 
394. ld. 
395. ld. at 815. 
396. Coffman v. Kuehler, 409 F. Supp. 546, 551 (N.D. Tex. 1976). 
397. Williams v. Vermillion Parish Sch. Bd., 345 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. La. 1972). 
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VI. DAMAGES FOR PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
VIOLATIONS 
51 
School officials who may have inadvertently violated the 
procedural due process rights of students, even though the 
discipline imposed was justified on the facts, may have only 
nominal damages awarded against them. In Carey v. Piphus, 
the Supreme Court reviewed a situation involving several ele-
mentary and secondary students in Illinois who had been sus-
pended from school for 20 days without being provided appro-
priate procedural due process.398 The district court had not 
awarded any damages to students, because they had not shown 
any specific monetary injury resulting from missing school for 
20 days. However, the Seventh Circuit held that the students 
were entitled to recover substantial damages regardless of 
proof of actual injury.399 
The Supreme Court disagreed with both lower courts and 
ruled that in the absence of proof of actual injury, students 
whose procedural rights were violated, but whose suspensions 
were justified on the facts, are entitled to recover only nominal 
damages not to exceed one dollar.400 The rationale for the de-
cision was that due process was not meant to protect against 
loss of protected rights, only against the mistaken or unjusti-
fied loss of life, liberty, or property.401 Of course, if a student 
can show that his or her procedural due process rights were 
violated and, had the student been provided an opportunity for 
a fair hearing, he or she would not have been found guilty and 
punished, the student may be given an opportunity to prove 
actual damages in excess of nominal damages.402 
Several subsequent court rulings have applied the concept 
of awarding one dollar as nominal damages in situations in-
volving student due process violations, where the student was 
guilty of the infraction. In one decision, students had been 
suspended by school administrators indefinitely without ade-
quate due process.403 In another, a student was awarded one 
dollar in nominal damages when school officials refused to al-
398. 4afi U.S. 247, 2fi0-51 (1978). 
:199. ld. at 2fil-fia. 
400. ld. at 266-67. 
401. ld. at 259. 
402. ld. at 248. 
4Qa. Darby v. Schoo, fi44 F. Supp. 428, 442 (W.D. Mich. 1982). 
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low cross-examination of a teacher at an expulsion hearing, but 
the student was actually guilty of insubordinate behavior to-
ward the teacher.404 
School officials should not be mistaken, however, in assum-
ing that the Carey ruling will prevent considerable out-of-pock-
et loss for violations of student due process rights. As provided 
in federal statute, if the student prevails in civil rights litiga-
tion, in addition to paying for their own legal services, school 
officials may have to pay for the student's attorney.405 
VII. SUMMARY 
Whatever else procedural due process may be, it remains 
little more than a process. It does not speak to the merits or 
the wisdom of a decision. Its purpose is merely to aid in 
achieving a proper and fair result. This is accomplished by 
requiring an appropriate procedure that better enables the 
decision maker to arrive at a fair and just decision. 
The most important court interpretation concerning proce-
dural due process in the context of discipline of public school 
students is found in Goss v. Lopez. In that ruling, the Supreme 
Court held that involuntary removal of students from public 
school, even for short periods of time, involved property and 
liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause and thus, 
school officials must provide students with at least a rudimen-
tary hearing. They must provide students with notice of the 
allegations of misconduct, and if the student denies the allega-
tions, the student must be provided with the evidence substan-
tiating the allegations and an opportunity to explain his or her 
version of the situation. At that time, school officials may de-
termine to investigate the matter further or they may make a 
decision regarding the punishment, or lack of punishment, of 
the student. School officials may provide additional due pro-
cess, but none is generally required. The Court did not require 
any more due process than that required by good educational 
practice. 
Subsequent court decisions have expanded and applied the 
spirit of the Goss ruling to long-term suspensions and expul-
sions, but they have not generally expanded student due pro-
cess rights into other areas, such as athletic participation, in-
404. Dillon v. Pulaski County Sch. Dist., 46R F.Supp. 54, 59 (E.D. Ark. 197R), 
affd, 594 F.2d 699, 700 (8th Cir. 1979). 
405. 42 u.s.c. § 1988 (1988). 
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school suspension where access to the educational program is 
allowed, and participation in school ceremonies, such as com-
mencement. Some situations, such as loss of a semester's aca-
demic credit or exclusion from all school activities for an ex-
tended time, may have different results. 
Generally a due process hearing must precede any decision 
to punish a student. If an emergency situation exists, such as 
the student being under the influence of drugs or acting in a 
violent manner, a hearing may be held at a later time. 
There is a universally accepted requirement that decisions 
1rade as a result of due process hearings be made by impartial 
decision makers. There is a strong legal presumption that 
school officials are not biased unless the student can establish 
actual bias. Mere allegations of bias do not result in improper 
decision making or a violation of due process. A decision maker 
is not biased merely because he or she observed the incident, 
conducted an investigation, or is employed by the same school 
considering the discipline of the student. If the alleged miscon-
duct was perpetrated against the decision maker, however, bias 
would more likely be present. The courts are divided on the 
issue of dual roles of prosecutor and advisor to the decision 
maker played by attorneys and administrators. 
Removal from school for longer than 10 days or possibly a 
short-term suspension coupled with other deprivations may 
result in the need for additional due process to be afforded the 
student. As the potential loss to the student increases, the 
school requirement to provide more process generally increases. 
In situations involving exclusion from school for longer 
than 10 days, it is desirable to have a written notice outlining 
the charges and stating the time, place, and date of the hear-
ing. The courts are divided on the issue of providing a list of 
witnesses and a summary of their proposed testimony in the 
notice. 
Court decisions are generally consistent in requiring stu-
dents who are being considered for long-term suspension or 
expulsion be given the opportunity to explain their version of 
the situation in a meaningful way. That is why due process 
requires little in the way of procedure if the student admits the 
misconduct and the facts are not in dispute. 
In addition to the requirements of notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard in situations of long-term suspension 
or expulsion, some courts have stated that a student can be 
punished only on the basis of evidence introduced at the hear-
ing; must be allowed to have an attorney present; must be 
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permitted to examine documents and confront and cross-exam-
ine witness, and must be allowed to have a verbatim record 
made. 
The courts are not consistent in their rulings on many of 
the elements of due process, especially those enumerated im-
mediately above. Those differences in court interpretation are a 
result not only of different interpretations in the various juris-
dictions, but also of court efforts to weigh student protected 
interests against additional procedural burdens on school offi-
cials. When the facts of a specific situation are weighed in this 
balance, prediction of result becomes quite difficult. 
Some court decisions have indicated that recognized errors 
in providing due process can be curred by starting over and 
providing the proper due process in a second hearing. If the 
student was guilty of an alleged infraction of school rules and 
was merely deprived of an element of due process without other 
loss, only nominal damages will be awarded. 
School officials and their attorneys must be aware of the 
law and the spirit of the Goss decision, and the precedential 
value of due process decisions in their various jurisdictions. 
They need to attempt to predict how a court might weigh the 
facts of a specific situation in making its decision. Taking a 
position of providing more due process than is minimally re-
quired gives school officials and their attorneys more latitude 
in defending against law suits and provides additional benefits 
to the school community. 
VIII. CoNCLUSION 
Probably no other language in the Constitution has engen-
dered more court decisions and legal discussion than the 
phrase "due process of law." Yet, with all the discourse and all 
the decisions, the exact meaning of the phrase remains elusive. 
We know that procedural due process is a flexible concept that 
results in differing requirements dependent upon differing 
factual circumstances. It is challenging, if not impossible, on a 
national scale to reasonably predict court application of specific 
elements of procedural due process in specific factual circum-
stances. More than any other area of education law, procedural 
due process is dependent upon the totality of the circumstances 
and the court jurisdiction involved. 
We also know that early fears of undue and meddlesome 
court intervention into the operation of the schools as a result 
of the Goss ruling has not come to pass. The courts have gen-
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erally been restrained in applying due process concepts to edu-
cational deprivations, other than exclusion, and have generally 
done a good job in balancing the students' interests against the 
added burdens that due process requirements might place on 
schools. Mter much litigation over the nearly two decades since 
Goss was decided, the courts have not greatly expanded due 
process beyond minimum protections of students' property and 
liberty interests. 
Yet, public schools continue to be taken into court to de-
fend their due process procedures. Much of the problem appe-
ars to be that educators spend a great deal of effort attempting 
to determine what minimal due process requirements are re-
quired and then end up spending a great deal of time attempt-
ing to defend the minimum due process they provide. They 
forget that while in the eyes of the law you can provide inade-
quate due process, you can never provide too much. If educa-
tors would become more concerned with treating students as 
they themselves would like to be treated, so that when due 
process minimums are not clear, an effort is made to provide 
students with extra process, they will save much time, effort, 
and money in the long run. While it sometimes takes a little 
more time and effort to give students more process than may 
be minimally due, much time and money may be saved because 
mounting a legal defense to challenges will be easier. If there 
are no gaping oversights or questionable areas in the process 
offered students charged with violation of school rules, legal 
challenges may not even arise. 
If a student being considered for short-term suspension 
alleges that a teacher's allegations against him are founded in 
the teacher's being out to get him, there will be little economy 
lost in confirming the teacher's allegations by conferring with 
other students or teachers, even though this is not required by 
the Goss decision. The time spent in further investigation may 
serve the real purpose of procedural due process, assuring the 
likelihood of correct decisions, and may eliminate, or make 
more defensible, the legal challenges made regarding the 
principal's action or inaction. Why spend legal fees and educa-
tional time defending decisions refusing cross-examination of 
teachers available for hearings, the making of verbatim re-
cords, or providing written decisions outlining the finding of 
facts in expulsion proceedings? None of these elements of addi-
tional procedural due process will overburden the school, but 
they may deter lawsuits from being filed, and they certainly 
will make it more likely that lawsuits will be won by schools. 
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For schools that want to extend reasonably full constitu-
tional procedural due process to students, both for their own 
self-protection and to serve as role models in the education of 
impressionable youth, the task is not difficult. In situations of 
short-term suspensions, or other deprivations arguably involv-
ing liberty or property interests, follow the Goss requirements 
of no removal prior to rudimentary hearing and oral or written 
notice of the alleged misconduct. If the student denies the alle-
gations, an explanation of the evidence and a chance for the 
student to present the student's position must be provided. If 
an emergency need to remove the student is present, provide 
the hearing as soon as reasonably possible thereafter. Although 
not required, if the student raises credible issues of fact, follow 
up with additional investigation or give the student a reason-
able opportunity to provide evidence. 
If the issue involves a long-term suspension or expulsion, it 
is better to provide greater due process than is minimally re-
quired, than to provide questionably adequate due process, 
inviting legal challenge. Generally, the student should not be 
punished by removal or by any other action prior to the hear-
ing. If the student must be removed immediately for the pro-
tection of the student or others, a separate rudimentary hear-
ing can be held for that purpose. Notice of the proposed long-
term suspension or expulsion hearing should be in writing and 
should provide the time, place, and date of the hearing, as well 
as an explanation of the charges in sufficient detail to allow 
preparation of a defense. Sometime prior to the hearing, the 
student may be provided a list of likely witnesses and a brief 
summary of their planned testimony. If the student reasonably 
requests additional time to obtain legal counsel or gather evi-
dence for the defense against charges, continuances should be 
granted. If the student contests the allegations, the student 
should be provided ample opportunity to present evidence in 
support of the defense of the charges. While subpoena of wit-
nesses may not be required, school officials should encourage 
witnesses requested by the student to attend the hearing. The 
student should be allowed to examine all evidence presented 
and to cross-examine all available witnesses. Mfidavits and 
hearsay evidence should be kept to a minimum and student 
witnesses should testify unless it can be established that retal-
iation is a strong possibility. Hearsay evidence should be sub-
stantiated by other evidence so that decisions are not based 
wholly on hearsay evidence. The student should have a right to 
be represented by legal counsel or other adult representative, 
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but the school should not be responsible for the student's de-
fense expenses. A verbatim record should be made by electronic 
recording or stenographer. The decision should be in writing 
and should include findings of facts with regard to each allega-
tion against the student. Discipline can be handed out regard-
ing each allegation. All allegations don't have to be proven in 
order for discipline to be administered. Decisions should be 
based only on evidence introduced at the hearing and subject to 
cross-examination by the student - facts not in evidence at the 
hearing should not be considered. Persons involved in the pros-
ecution of the student should not be present at the deliberation 
stage, unless the student is also allowed to be present. Decision 
makers should excuse themselves from the process when infor-
mation is present that would indicate that they may not be 
objective in making a decision. 
Obviously, not all of the foregoing elements of procedural 
due process are required in all circumstances or in all jurisdic-
tions. They merely represent the items of due process that 
public school officials should observe for purposes of better 
decision making, being a role model, fairness, exhibiting good 
educational principles, and lessening the likelihood of being in 
or losing a lawsuit. 
Time, money, and effort will eventually disclose what mini-
mal procedural due process elements are required on almost 
any set of facts in any jurisdiction. Additional school officials' 
time, money, and effort will be used in defending the use of 
minimal procedural due process in court. But educators' time, 
money and effort can be better spent in other pursuits if they 
plan ahead to provide more than minimal due process to stu-
dents. They will at the same time be modeling valuable lessons 
to students that will have a positive impact on the future of the 
country. Students will learn to treat others fairly when they 
are treated fairly. 
